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Notes
IT'S ALL RELATIVE: A GRAPIUCAL
REASONING MODEL FOR LIBERALIZING
RECOVERY FOR NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF
EMOTIONAL DISTRESS BEYOND THE
IMMEDIATE FAMILY*
I. INTRODUCTION

Richard Elden and Linda Ebeling, an engaged couple who lived together,
were riding in a car when they were broadsided by a truck driven by Robert
Sheldon.' Ebeling was thrown from the car and suffered massive injuries
which resulted in her death a few hours later. 2 Elden sued Sheldon for
negligent infliction of emotional distress (NIED). 3 In Elden v. Sheldon, the
California Supreme Court denied her of any recovery, relying on policy
considerations, primarily that of the states's interest in the marriage
relationship. 4 The court held that to the extent that unmarried cohabitants are
granted the same rights as married persons, the state's interest in promoting
marriage is inhibited.'
In rejecting the cohabitant's claim in Elden, the California Supreme Court
stressed the need for a "sufficiently definite and predictable test that could be
consistently applied to similar fact patterns from case to case. " ' As courts
address the outer reaches of bystander recovery, a lack of functional guidelines

- This note is written in honor of my father, the late Guy Bassi, who made the pursuit of
perfection a routine procedure, and whose concept of the family relationship was broad enough to
include any human being with heart and thought to share.
1. Elden v. Sheldon, 758 P.2d 582, 582 (Cal. 1988).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 583.
4. Id. at 586. This policy in favor'of formal marriage was expressed in the abolition of
common law marriage in .1895; see Estate of Abate, 333 P.2d 200 (Cal. 1958) and Norman v.
Thomson, 54 P. 143 (Cal. 1898), and it has been reaffirmed in numerous cases since that time. See,
e.g., Ledger v. Tippitt, 164 Cal. App. 3d 625 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985); Norman v. Unemployment Ins.
Appeals Bd., 663 P.2d 904 (Cal. 1983); Deyoe v. Superior Court, 74 P. 28 (Cal. 1903).
5. Elden v. Sheldon, 758 P.2d 582, 586 (Cal. 1988).
6. Id. at 582, 587 (holding that application of such factors as the sexual fidelity of the parties
and their emotional and economic ties would require a court to undertake a massive intrusion into
the private life of the partners, and application of these factors would not provide a sufficiently
definite and predictable test).
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results in a patchwork of rulings and inconsistent opinions concerning who shall
recover. Consequentially, judicial efficiency suffers as each court responds to
a claim for NIED in a different manner. Emotional distress has been recognized
in the United States for over one hundred years as a distinct item of damage for
which recovery may be obtained.7 However, courts have historically allowed
plaintiffs to maintain a cause of action for mental distress, either intentionally
or negligently inflicted, only in the presence of special limiting or qualifying
factors! This Note will show that these factors are obstacles to recovery,
artificial devices to guarantee the genuineness of the claim and, at times, may
actually foreclose relief to a genuine claim. 9
In general, if no independently protected right has been violated, mental
distress alone has not been deemed sufficient to create a cause of action.1 0
Invasion of an individual's right to peace of mind was first recognized as the
result of intentional, rather than negligent, conduct." Therefore, emotional
distress as a basis for a negligence action can be placed in perspective by
reviewing the development of the common law recognition of a protectable
interest in individual peace of mind. 2
Although courts have generally conceded that the interest in personal
emotional stability is worthy of legal protection against unreasonable conduct,
initially emotional distress was recognized as an item of damages and did not in

7. See Stuart v. Western Union Tel. Co., 18 S.W. 351 (Tex. 1885).
8. Joseph A. Strubbe, Should Short-Term Mental DistressDamagesBe Compensable? The Air
Crash Case, 60 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 971 (1984). Traditional obstacles to recovery for emotional
distress are: 1) the requirement that the plaintiff suffer a physical injury or impact; 2) the
requirement that the plaintiff be present in the zone of danger where the conduct causing the injury
took place; 3) the requirement of a blood relationship between the plaintiff and the victim of the
injury; 4) the requirement of a physical manifestation of the emotional distress; 5) the requirement
of sensory and contemporaneous observance of the injury; and 6) the requirement that the emotional
distress be an element of damage from a breach of other law, such as a breach of contract. See
generally Leong v. Takasaki, 520 P.2d 758 (Haw. 1974).
9. Leong, 520 P.2d at 763.
10. Comment, Negligently Inflicted Mental Distress: The Case ForAn Independent Tort, 59
GEO. L.J. 1237, 1238 (1971). Mental suffering is recompensed only as one element of the damages
awarded for the violation of a protected right. Id.
11. Thing v. La Chusa, 771 P.2d 814, 816 (Cal. 1989).
12. Id. The interest to be protected is the right to be free from socially unacceptable conduct
that seriously affects another's peace of mind. Id. Express or implicit recognition that peace of
mind warrants legal protection is found in recovery for emotional distress as an aggravation of
damages sought under intentional tort theories. Id. (quoting 5 BERNARD E. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF
CAL. LAW-TORTS § 402, at 483 (9th ed. 1988)). With few exceptions, causing mental distress did
not itself create a right of action, and where mental distress alone exists the common law rarely
permitted recovery of damages. Id.
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itself create a right of action.13 As the type of conduct that was actionable for
a claim of emotional distress expanded from intentional acts to negligent acts,
limitations on recovery were devised to prevent fraudulent claims. A doctrine
known as the "Physical Impact Rule" limited recovery for NIED to cases where
the injured party sustained a contemporaneous physical impact or injury. 4
Abuse of the impact rule, as well as advances in medical science permitting
identification of psychic injury, led to abandonment of the rule by most of the
courts that had once embraced it.'" As use of the "physical impact rule"
declined, the "zone of danger rule" came into widespread use." The "zone
of danger rule" allows a witness to recover for mental suffering without a
contemporaneous physical impact.' 7

13. Stuart v. Western Union Tel. Co., 18 S.W. 351, 353 (Tex. 1885) (holding that damages
for mental anguish may be recovered as an element growing out of a breach of contract action). See
generally PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 12 (4th ed. 1971) (stating that historically emotional distress
was treated as a "parasitic" item of damages, requiring a host cause of action as a basis for
establishing a right to recovery). Recognition of emotional distress as a compensable injury resulted
in the focus on the defendant's conduct, and development of the tort now known as intentional
infliction of emotional distress. Thing, 771 P.2d at 817.
14. 1 MARILYN MINZER ET AL., DAMAGES IN TORT ACTIONS § 5.13, at 5-25 (1992 & Supp.
May 1992).
15. Id. at 5-27. See aLso Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Gottshall, 114 S. Ct. 2396 (1994) (stating
that most jurisdictions have abandoned the physical impact test). For examples of cases from at least
five states that continue to adhere to the physical impact test, see Ob-Gyn Assocs. of Albany v.
Littleton, 386 S.E.2d 146 (Ga. 1989); Shuamber v. Henderson, 579 N.E.2d 452 (Ind. 1991);
Anderson v. Scheffler, 752 P.2d 667 (Kan. 1988); Deutsch v. Schein, 597 S.W.2d 141 (Ky. 1980);
Hammond v. Central Lane Communications Ctr., 816 P.2d 593 (Ore. 1991).
16. 1 MINZER Er AL., supra note 14, § 5.14, at 5-50. The "zone of danger test" currently is
followed in 14 jurisdictions. See Keck v. Jackson, 593 P.2d 668 (Ariz. 1979); Towns v. Anderson,
579 P.2d 1163 (Colo. 1978); Robb v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 210 A.2d 709 (Del. 1965); Williams
v. Baker, 572 A.2d 1062 (D.C. 1990); Rickey v. Chicago Transit Auth., 457 N.E.2d 1, (111.1983);
Resavage v. Davies, 86 A.2d 879 (Md. 1952); Stadler v. Cross, 295 N.W.2d 552 (Minn. 1980);
Asaro v. Cardinal Glennon Memorial Hosp., 799 S.W.2d 595 (Mo. 1990); Bovsun v. Sanperi, 461
N.E.2d 843 (N.Y. 1984); Whetham v. Bismarck Hosp., 197 N.W.2d 678 (N.D. 1972); Shelton v.
Russell Pipe & Foundry Co., 570 S.W.2d 861 (Tenn. 1978); Boucher v. Dixie Medical Ctr., 850
P.2d 1179 (Utah 1992); Jobin v. McQuillen, 609 A.2d 990 (Vt. 1992); Garrett v. New Berlin, 362
N.W.2d 137 (Wis. 1985). See Consolidated Rail Corp., 114 S. Ct. at 2396 n.9.
17. 1 MINZER Er AL., supra note 14, § 5.14, at 5-48 to 5-49. The "zone of danger rule"
avoids the contemporaneousphysical impact requirement, instead permitting plaintiffs to recover for
their own mental suffering with resultant physical injury, provided they were within the zone of
danger to their physical well-being at the time they sustained the fright, shock, or emotional distress
giving rise to their claim. Id. The "zone of danger rule" has been adopted by many jurisdictions,
including many which abandoned the impact rule, as well as those that rejected the impact rule from
the outset. Id. at 5-50. Many jurisdictions have done so by adopting the Second Restatement of
Torts § 436 (h) which is the essence of the zone of danger rule. Id.
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However, as expansion of the cause of action for NIED continued,
subsequent decisions of the courts created more uncertainty. 18 As this Note
will point out, the "zone of danger" rule was abandoned as an arbitrary
restriction on recovery, giving rise to the "zone of psychic risk," which assesses
criteria of foreseeability under the circumstances of time, place, and
relationship. 9 As the "zone of psychic risk" has been more widely applied,
the class of individuals worthy of protection of personal emotional stability has
expanded from the direct victim of unreasonable conduct, to the witness, or
bystander, of such conduct.'
An analysis of the relationship between
bystander and victim creates the problem of assessing who should recover in a
bystander NIED claim.2

18. See infra section 11I.B, notes 173-200 and accompanyingtext for an illustration of decisions
inconsistent with the Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912 (Cal. 1968) guidelines.
19. Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912, 920 (Cal. 1968) (abandoning the zone of physical danger
as an articulable means of assuring the genuineness of a bystander's claim, and replacing it with a
proximity test geared to the psychic risk). The court held that the bystander must be in close
physical proximity to the accident scene at the time of the occurrence of the accident underlying the
claim for recovery. Id. The Dillon court intended that its requirement that the plaintiff-bystander's
shock must have resulted from a direct emotional impact upon the plaintiff from the sensory and
contemporaneous observance of the accident serves as a means to deny recovery to persons who
learn of the accident from others after its occurrence. Id. Portee v. Jaffee, 417 A.2d 521, 526
(N.J. 1980) (adopting a broadened rule of bystander recovery by concluding that the relationship-tovictim criteria is the most important of those designed to determine liability). "The law should find
more than pity for one who is stricken by seeing that a loved one has been critically injured or
killed." Id.
20. See generally 1 MINZER Er AL., supra note 14, § 5.21, at 5-59. Nearly half of the states
now allow bystanders outside of the zone of danger to obtain recovery in certain circumstances for
emotional distress brought on by witnessing the injury or death of a third party that is caused by the
defendant's negligence. See Croft v. Wicker, 737 P.2d 789 (Alaska 1987); Thing v. La Chusa, 771
P.2d 814 (Cal. 1989); Champion v. Gray, 478 So. 2d 17 (Fla. 1985); Fineran v. Pickett, 465
N.W.2d 662 (Iowa 1991); Lejeune v. Rayne Branch Hosp., 556 So. 2d 559 (La. 1990); Cameron
v. Pepin, 610 A.2d 279 (Me. 1992); Stockdale v. Bird & Son, Inc. 503 N.E.2d 951 (Mass. 1987);
Nugent v. Bauermeister, 489 N.W.2d 148 (1992), appeal denied, 503 N.W.2d 904 (Mich. 1993);
Entex, Inc. v. McGuire, 414 So. 2d 437 (Miss. 1982); Maguire v. State, 835 P.2d 755 (Mont.
1992); James v. Lieb, 375 N.W.2d 109 (Neb. 1985); Buck v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 783 P.2d 437
(Nev. 1989); Wilder v. City of Keene, 557 A.2d 636 (N.H. 1989); Frame v. Kothari, 560 A.2d 675
(N.J. 1989); Folz v. State, 797 P.2d 246 (N.M. 1990); Johnson v. Ruark Obstetrics & Gynecology
Assoc., 395 S.E.2d 85 (N.C. 1990); Paugh v. Hanks, 451 N.E.2d 759 (Ohio 1983); Sinn v. Burd,
404 A.2d 672 (Pa. 1979); Reilly v. United States, 547 A.2d 894 (R.I. 1988); Kinard v. Augusta
Sash & Door Co., 336 S.E.2d 465 (S.C. 1985); Boyles v. Kerr, 855 S.W.2d 593 (rex. 1993); Gain
v. Carroll Mill Co., 787 P.2d 553 (Wash. 1990); Heldreth v. Marrs, 425 S.E.2d 157 (W.Va. 1992);
Contreras v. Carbon County School District No. 1, 843 P.2d 589 (Wyo. 1992).
21. See 1 MINZER ET AL., supra note 14, § 5.24, at 5-95 (describing whether a particular
bystander-victim relationship will, with the other Dillon criteria, give rise to a bystander cause of
action depending primarily on the receptivity of a given court to recognize the relationship involved
as one meriting legal support). "To date, unanswered is whether the relationship analysis might be
extended to include non-family friends or even strangers under appropriate circumstances." Id.
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This Note examines the responses of courts beyond the strict limitations of
the immediate family to the right of a bystander to recover, and exposes the
limitations inherent in requiring a blood, spousal or adoptive relationship.
Further, this Note proposes an alternative approach for the legal recognition of
a non-family bystander as a plaintiff worthy of recovery for NIED. In
considering such an expansion, this Note advocates that the protection of one's
emotional interests outweighs the burdens of imposing a new species of
negligence liability.' The requirement that the plaintiff must be related to the
victim by blood, marriage, or adoption in order to recover for NIED is
overinclusive because it permits recovery when the suffering accompanies a legal
or biological link between bystander and victim, regardless of whether the
relationship between the two is estranged, alienated, or in some other way
removed. Conversely, the requirement is underinclusive because it arbitrarily
denies court access to persons with valid claims that they could prove if
permitted to do so.'
Development of new rules to determine the right of a
bystander to recover raises the concern that if recovery for NIED is extended
to a new class of bystanders, several problems will arise. 2'
This Note will show that traditional arguments against expanding the class
of plaintiffs who may recover for the negligent infliction of mental harm beyond
the immediate family are rarely justified. Just as parasitic damages and physical
injury obscured the principles that best explained the holdings of the courts in
non-bystander actions for NIED, 2 the requirement for a blood relationship
obscures who is worthy of recovery in a bystander action. With a more general
willingness to provide for liability, the character of the defendant's behavior, as
well as the relationship between the victim and the bystander, become of prime
An
importance and will serve to guarantee the genuineness of the claim.'

22. Portee v. Jaffee, 417 A.2d 521, 528 (N.J. 1980). The court in Jaffe held that the interest
in personal emotional stability is worthy of legal protection against unreasonable conduct, and that
emotional stability is sufficiently important to warrant protection. Id. Further, limiting judicial
redress to harm inflicted on intimate emotional bonds by the death or serious injury of a loved one
serves to prevent liability from exceeding the culpability of defendant's conduct. Id.
23. St. Elizabeth Hosp. v. Garrard, 730 S.W.2d 649, 652 (Tex. 1987).
24. Leong v. Takasaki, 520 P.2d 758, 761 (Haw. 1974). The specific problems that courts
have been concerned with are: 1) a fear of fraudulent claims; 2) the potential of unlimited and
indefinite liability for every type of mental disturbance; 3) unforeseeability of the injury; and 4) the
imposition of burdensome and disproportionate liability on the tortfeasor in relation to his
culpability. Id.
25. Thing v. La Chusa, 771 P.2d 814, 817 n.2 (Cal. 1989). In many instances where the only
substantial harm was emotional, recovery was allowed by finding some traditional legal peg on
which to hang it. 2 HARPER SlTAL., THE LAW OF TORTS 606-07 (2d ed. 1986). Thus, if the court
could find a battery or trespass, however technical, it was much less reluctant to uphold a plaintiff's
claim for mental suffering. Id. Gradually, however, the understanding grew that resort to such
devices obscured the principle that best explained the holdings of the courts. Id.
26. See supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text.
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expansion of the bystander recovery rule with a focus on the emotional ties
between the bystander and victim, taken in context with the circumstances under
which the bystander witnessed the negligent act, will protect the interest to be
free of emotional distress.
Determining the genuineness of a claim of mental distress requires the
development of general standards in a case-by-case analysis by focusing on the
duty between the bystander and victim, rather than the tortfeasor and victim.'
The definition of what constitutes a "family" has been rapidly changing in the
last several years, with the rise of single parent households, foster parents, and
relationships within the gay community.' The concerns of excessive litigation
must be balanced against the rights of close family members, but the question
of who qualifies as an individual who may recover under a tort action for NIED
has been left up to the judge to decide. This Note will provide a set of rules
that will employ "objective factors" other than the bystander-victim relationship
itself, to assist courts in identifying those parties worthy of recovery.' Such

27. Such an analysis serves to validate those relationships that are sufficient to trigger a
compensable level of emotional distress but which do not involve members of the "immediate
family," thereby preventing worthy non-family members from being summarily precluded from
recovery. See Sheila A. Hallahan, The Survey Of New York Practice: Developments In The Law:
The Appellate Division, Fourth Department, Declines To Expand The Scope Of The "Immediate
Family"RequirementFor BystanderRecovery Under The Negligent Infliction OfEmotional Distress
Doctrine, 67 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 439, 445 (1993).
28. Note, Looking ForA Family Resemblance: The Limits Of The FunctionalApproach To 7he
Legal Definition Of Family, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1640, 1640 (1991). According to Census Bureau
figures, the proportion of American households consisting of a married couple and their own minor
children has declined from 44.2% in 1960 to 27.0% in 1988. See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S.
DEP'T OF COMMERCE, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, SPECIAL STUDIES SERIES P-23 No. 163,
CHANGES IN AMERICAN FAMILY LIFE 10 (1989). In 1988, single parents with their own minor
children constituted 27.3 % of American households, more than double the number of single-parent
families in 1970. Id. at 13. Between 1980 and 1985, the number of children living with a
stepparent increased 11.6% from 6,082,000 to 6,789,000. See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S.
DEP'T OF COMMERCE, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, SPECIAL STUDIES SERIES, P-23 No. 162,
STUDIES IN MARRIAGE AND THE FAMILY 28-29 (June 1989). The number of unmarried couple
households consisting of two unrelated adults of the opposite sex (with or without children under 15
years old) rose from 523,000 in 1970 to 2,764,000 in 1989. See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S.
DEP'T OF COMMERCE, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, POPULATION CHARACTERISTICS SERIES P-

20, No. 445, MARITAL STATUS AND LIVING ARRANGEMENTS 6 (March 1989). The actual number
of heterosexual cohabitants may be higher because this estimate does not include households with
more than two unrelated adults. Id. at 6 n.4. In the past, government population surveys have not
included homosexual cohabitants. Reliable figures on the number of gays and lesbians living
together are difficult to obtain, but many sources indicate that this number is clearly increasing. See,
e.g., Anne Strook, Gay "Divorces" Complicatedby Lack Of Laws, SAN FRANCISCO CHRON., May
14, 1990, at A4 (noting that there are an increasing number of homosexuals involved in long-term
relationships).
29. For a complete discussion of the "objective factors" see infra note 258 and accompanying
text.
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a reasoning model will bring consistency to future bystander recovery decisions
in a judicially efficient manner.
In Section II, this Note explores the historical background of NIED as an
independent tort.3 Section III provides an overview of landmark decisions,
from the seminal case of Dillon v. Legg, 3 1 which established the right of a
plaintiff other than a direct victim of a negligent act to recover for NIED, to
Thing v. La Chusa,32 which imposed stricter standards on the Dillon guidelines
in order to prevent further expansion beyond bystanders that had
contemporaneously viewed the accident. 33 Section IV of this Note reviews the
most recent expansion of the bystander recovery rule in Dunphy v. Gregor,'
which further extended bystander recovery to include parties that are not
immediate family members of the third party. Section IV also provides a
summary of the various judicial opinions that set forth assorted judicial guideline
provisions that influenced the Dunphy court to arrive at its decision. 35 Section
IV concludes by analyzing the arguments used by the courts to grant recovery
to bystanders that were not traditionally allowed relief.' Finally, Section V
of this Note will survey policy considerations surrounding bystander claims in
order to devise a model that provides various factors to be used in a case-bycase determination. 37 Section V will furnish a procedure that will reduce the
use of a bright line rule to determine liability and will offer a more equitable
Further, by balancing the concerns of
solution to bystander recovery.'
excessive litigation against the rights of bystanders in a close relationship that
is not linked by blood, marriage, or adoption, this model will solve the problem
of a lack of criteria for expanding bystander recovery, and will serve to achieve
a cohesive policy regarding the desirability of recovery for certain classes of
plaintiffs, instead of a patchwork of rulings on individual causes of action.

30. See infra section 11, notes 39-103 and accompanying text.
31. 441 P.2d 912 (Cal. 1968). See infra section HI.A.1, notes 110-23 and accompanyingtext.
32. 771 P.2d 814 (Cal. 1989). See infra section HL.B, notes 173-200 and accompanying text.
33. See infra section EI, notes 104-200 and accompanying text. The scope of section II begins
with an analysis of Dillon because it was the first case to set out standards for bystander recovery.
Section UI ends with Thing because it was the first case from the same court to restrict the Dillon
guidelines, indicating a pause in the trend of constant expansion of bystander recovery for NIED.
34. See infra section IV.A, notes 206-15 and accompanying text.
35. Id.
36. See infra section IV.B-C, notes 216-53 and accompanying text.
37. See infra section V, notes 254-96 and accompanying text.
38. See infra section V.B, notes 275-96 and accompanying text.
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II. BACKGROUND OF NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS
A. History and Development of Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress
Damages for emotional distress have been recognized by the courts for
years. 9 The types of mental or emotional injuries for which damages are
presently recoverable include fright, nervousness, grief, anxiety, worry,
mortification, shock, humiliation, and indignity, as well as physical pain.' As
early as 1885, the Texas Supreme Court, in Stuart v. Western Union Telegraph
Company,41 recognized that mental suffering resulting from indignity was a
compensable injury.42 In Stuart, a telegraph office failed to deliver a message
concerning the death of the plaintiff's brother, despite the plaintiff having
informed Western Union of the status of his brother's health and his anxiety to
hear the latest news.4' The court, following an earlier decision in Hays v.
RailroadCompany,4' held that mental distress could be an element of damages
in a suit for negligence.'
Even though the action in Stuart was one for a
breach of contract, the decision recognized mental distress as a form of
injury.' However, the emotional distress was viewed as the damage element
to a breach of contract action, and not as an independent tort. 47

This stage in

the development of NIED is viewed as significant because the action was
authorized as an alternate dispute resolution mechanism, rather than a
recognition of a right to mental tranquility. 4
The Texas courts further liberalized the view on damages for emotional
distress five years later in Hill v. Kimball.49
In Hill, the plaintiff had a
miscarriage upon witnessing the defendant assault two black men on her

39. See Stuart v. Western Union Tel. Co., 18 S.W. 351, 353 (Tex. 1885); Consolidated
Traction Co. v. Lambertson, 36 A. 100 (N.J. 1896); Kentucky Traction & Terminal Co. v. Roman's
Guardian, 23 S.W.2d 272 (Ky. 1929).
40. Deevy v. Tassi, 130 P.2d 389, 389 (Cal. 1942).
41. 18 S.W. 351, 353 (Tex. 1885).
42. Id.
43. Id. at 351.
44. Id. at 353.
45. The court stated that "pain of mind, anxiety, and all forms of distress peculiar to a sentient
being have been held elements of actual damage in suits for injuries to the person through the
negligence of others." Stuart v. Western Union Tel. Co., 18 S.W. 351, 353 (Tex. 1885).
46. Id.
47. Id. at 354 (holding that where mental distress alone exists, recovery for damages was not
permitted pursuant to the "parasitic damages" doctrine, which has stood the test of time, and noting
that courts in modern times still hesitate to award damages in the absence of a breach of another
legal duty).
48. See Richard N. Pearson, Liability to BystandersFor Negligently Inflicted Emotional Harm
-A Comment On The Nature Of Arbitrary Rules, 34 U. FLA. L. REV. 477, 486 (1982).
49. 13 S.W. 59 (Tex. 1890).
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property.'
The Supreme Court of Texas held that no distinction existed
between an injury resulting from intentional violence and one resulting from
negligence. 5 Further, the plaintiff sustained a bodily injury by means of the
operation of the mind and the suffering of the fright itself.52 . The Hill court
moved closer to modem law by recognizing the infliction of emotional distress
as an independent cause of action, rather than as a result of a violation of other
laws. 3 This Section has discussed the early recognition of emotional distress
as a compensable item of damage. Section II.B will present the means by which
recovery for emotional distress was granted as courts continued to acknowledge
NIED as an independent tort.
B. TraditionalMechanisms for Recovery
Acknowledgment by the courts that emotional injury by itself resulting from
negligence merits compensation brought with it the notion that limits on such
recovery must be devised to avoid fraudulent claims.'
The first limitation
placed on the right to recover for NIED was the "Physical Impact Rule"
("Impact Rule"). 55 Under the impact rule, which originated in England, in
order to recover for emotional distress, the plaintiff had to suffer physical

50. Id.
51. Id. at 59-60. The court considered such a distinction to be significant because under Texas
law, a lawsuit concerning an injury resulting from negligence must be brought in the plaintiff's
county of residence. ld. at 60. The court held that making no distinction was in the plaintiff's best
interest as the injured party. Id.
52. d. at 60. The court recognized that it may be more difficult to prove the connection
between the alleged cause and the injury but held that, if the connection is proved and the injury is
the proximate result of the cause, the court would not deny the action. Id. at 59. Further, the fact
that it is more difficult to produce such an injury through operation of the mind affords no grounds
for refusal of compensation. Id. Significantly, the court indicated that "probably" no action would
lie when there was no injury except the suffering of the fright itself. Id.
53. Hill v.Kimball, 13 S.W. 59, 59 (rex. 1890). This is in contrast to the Stuart court, which
required a breach of contract as a host claim to a parasitic action for emotional distress. See supra
notes 41-48. The Hill court declined to distinguish between an injury resulting from intentional
violence and one resulting from negligence. Hill, 13 S.W. at 59.
54. Julie A. Davies, DirectActions ForEmotionalHarm: Is Compromise Possible?, 67 WASH.
L. REV. 1, 1 (1992).
55. Victorian Rys. Comm'rs v. Coultas, 13 App. Cas. 222 (Eng. 1888). In Coultas, a
gatekeeper negligently allowed Mr. Coultas and his wife to drive their buggy across a railroad
crossing as a locomotive came towards them. There was no collision; however, the plaintiffs
suffered shock and other physical manifestations as a result of the occurrence. The court determined
that the plaintiff's injuries normally would not occur as a result of the gatekeeper's negligent act,
and concluded that an award of damages would extend liability for the act beyond the fault of the
defendant. Shortly thereafter, American courts applied the reasoning of the Coultas court to similar
claims. See Braun v. Craven, 51 N.E. 657 (Ill.
1898); Cleveland C.C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v.
Stewart, 56 N.E. 917 (Ind. Ct. App. 1900); Spade v. Lynn & Boston R. Co., 47 N.E. 88 (Mass.
1897).
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impact or injury which, in turn, produced the emotional distress.' Without
any physical contact, no recovery was allowed for the mental pain and
suffering.57 The primary purpose for requiring physical contact has been to
deter plaintiffs from fabricating claims for emotional distress.2 However,
because the impact rule is interpreted broadly, it has failed to prevent fraudulent
claims.59 The requirement has been satisfied by a host of impacts, ranging
from the substantial to the trivial and ludicrous.'
Courts have also required physical impact because emotional injuries
suffered in the absence of physical impact were not seen to be as foreseeable as
the proximate consequences of the defendant's negligent conduct.61 Further,
since emotional injuries were often difficult to validate, the absence of physical
impact could hinder the plaintiff's ability to prove that mental anguish was the
consequence of the defendant's negligence.62 However, recent medical studies
have correlated emotional distress with various types of health problems, such
as cancer, cardiovascular disease, diabetes and other illnesses.' These studies
indicate that claims based on physical impact or injury should no longer be
considered more valid than claims based on emotional injuries unaccompanied
by impact.'
Another reason for perpetuating the impact rule was the belief that without
a requirement of physical impact, a flood of litigation in bystander cases would
occur.' However, according to the Florida District Court of Appeals in Stuart

56. See, e.g., Beatty v. Buckeye Fabric Finishing Co., 179 F. Supp. 688, 697 (E.D. Ark.
1959); Morse v. Chesapeake& 0 Ry. Co., 77 S.W. 361, 362 (Ky. Ct. App. 1903).
57. Beatty, 179 F. Supp. at 697; Morse, 77 S.W. at 362.
58. Stewart, 56 N.E. at 920-21; Spade, 47 N.E. at 88-89; Mitchell v. Rochester Ry. Co., 45
N.E. 354, 354-55 (N.Y. 1896); Huston v. Borough of Freemansburg, 61 A. 1022, 1023 (Pa. 1905).
59. Courts have found the impact rule satisfied in minor contacts with the person which play
no part in causing physical harm. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 331 (4th ed.
1971). See, e.g., Kenney v. Wong Len, 128 A. 343 (N.H. 1925) (mouse hair in stew touched
plaintiff's mouth); Zelinsky v. Chimics, 175 A.2d 351 (Pa. 1961) (ostling of occupants in
automobile).
60. See supra note 59.
61. See Braun v. Craven, 51 N.E. 657 (Ill. 1898).
62. Keith J. Wenk, Negligent Infliction Of EraotionalDistress: Liberalizing Recovery Beyond
The Zone Of DangerRule, Rickey v. Chicago Transit Authority, 60 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 735, 738
(1984).
63. See Bahnson, Stress and Cancer: The State of the Art, 21 PSYCHOSOMATICS 975 (1980);
Buell & Elliot, Stress and CardiovascularDisease, 75 J.S.C. MED. A. 494 (1979); Bradely, Life
Events and the Controlof DiabetesMellitus, 23 J. PSYCHOSOMATIC RESEARCH 159 (1979); Rabkin
& Struening, Life Events, Stress and Illness, 194 SCIENCE 1013 (1976).
64. See generally, Bahnson, supra note 63; Buell & Elliot, supra note 63, Bradely, supra note
63; Rabkin & Struening, supra note 63.
65. Falzone v. Busch, 214 A.2d 12, 14-16 (N.J. 1965); Ward v. West Jersey & Seashore R.R.
Co., 47 A. 561, 562 (N.J. 1900).
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v. Gilliam,6 the feared onslaught of litigation has not appeared in those states
allowing recovery for injuries without impact.67 The court also noted that the
fear of an increase in litigation should not outweigh a plaintiff's right to recover
for emotional distress.6
Abuses of the impact rule, as well as the inability to grant recovery to
deserving plaintiffs, prompted the majority of American jurisdictions to reject
it and to adopt emerging standards regarding bystander recovery. 9 The two
rules most frequently applied by the courts to effectuate limitations on recovery
have been the "zone of danger rule" and the "foreseeability-plus-serious-injury
rule," also known as the "Dillon Expansion.'
The "zone of danger rule" avoids the requirement of contemporaneous
physical impact or injury and allows a plaintiff to recover for mental distress in
those cases in which the "impact rule" would deny recovery. 7 This rule limits
claims for emotional distress in a consistent manner by substituting the
requirement of actual impact with the requirement of being near the danger.'
The "zone of danger rule" permits plaintiffs to recover for mental suffering
manifested in physical injury provided that they were within the zone of danger
to their physical well-being at the time that they sustained the fright, shock, or
mental distress giving rise to their claim.' The basic premise of the "zone of
danger rule" is to liberalize the foreseeability boundaries of the "impact rule,"
substituting "actual impact" with a "reasonable fear of impact" as a prerequisite

66. 271 So. 2d 466, 475 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972). Every court that has been confronted with
a challenge to its impact rule has been threatened with the specter of an avalanche of unmeritorious
claims. Niederman v. Brodsky, 261 A.2d 84, 87 (Pa. 1970). The virtually unanimous response of
the courts that have abrogated the impact rule has been that 1) the danger of illusory claims in this
area is no greater than in cases where impact occurs and that 2) courts have proven that any
protection against such fraudulent claims is contained within the integrity of the judicial process
itself, by way of expert witnesses and the safeguards of evidentiary standards. Niederman, 261 A.2d
at 88.
67. Niederman, 261 A.2d at 88.
68. Stuart, 271 So. 2d at 475. See also Okrina v. Midwestern Corp., 165 N.W.2d 259, 263
(Minn. 1969); Sinn v. Burd, 404 A.2d 672, 680 (Pa. 1979); Niederman v. Brodsky, 261 A.2d 84,
89 (Pa. 1970).
69. Wenk, supra note 62, at 738-39; See also Bowman v. Williams, 165 A. 182, 184 (Md.
1933) (holding that even though giving a cause of action to everyone sustaining injury from negligent
conduct tends to multiply fictitious claims, the difficulty is common and surmountable, and should
not prevent the operation of the theory of the common law that there is a remedy for every
substantial wrong).
70. Davies, supra note 54, at 1.
71. Strubbe, supra note 8, at 974.
72. Davies, supra note 54, at 8 n.32.
73. 1 MINZER zr AL., supra note 14, at § 5. Thus, a negligent actor will be liable to a plaintiff
for NIED where the actor's negligence, in addition to harm or peril to a third person, has otherwise
created an unreasonable risk of bodily harm to the plaintiff. Id. § 5.23 at 5-64.
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for recovery.74 The rule provides that the parameters of the duty to avoid the
negligent infliction of emotional harm ought to be commensurate with the duty
to avoid the creation of unreasonable risks of physical harm.75
The "zone of danger rule" is now adhered to by a majority of
jurisdictions. 6 Although allowing recovery in a much broader range of fact
patterns than the "impact rule," courts using the "zone of danger rule" employ
limiting elements in an attempt to prevent frivolous or fraudulent claims. 77 The
most common limitation requires that7 the mental distress result, or be manifested
in, either physical illness or injury. 8
The zone of danger rule has been criticized for excluding persons who
suffer a threat of physical harm. 79 Like the "impact rule," the "zone of danger
rule" does not allow recovery for purely mental distress alone.' A physical
injury or symptom is required."' However, the "zone of danger rule" alters
the sequence of events under which recovery may be allowed.' While the
"impact rule" demands that the physical injury or impact occur prior to, or
contemporaneously with, the alleged wrong giving rise to the mental distress,'
mental distress under the "zone of danger rule" must precede the physical
manifestations and must cause the illness or injury."

74. Plummer v. United States, 580 F.2d 72 (3d Cir. 1978) (stating that the focal point of the
"zone of danger" test is the foreseeability of injury to the plaintiff).
75. Davies, supra note 54, at 3. Ms. Davies concludes that liability for negligence will not be
"disproportionate to fault." Id. at 6-7 nn.21-30.
76. 1 MINzER Er AL., supra note 14, § 5.13, at 5-27. See id. § 5.14(1), at 5-50 nn.3-4. See
supra note 20 for a list of less than half of the 50 states that allow recovery to bystanders outside
of the zone of danger. See supra notes 15-16 for a list of the remaining states that require the zone
of danger, or physical impact test, which requires the plaintiff to be in the zone of danger.
77. Daley v. LaCroix, 179 N.W.2d 390 (Mich. 1970); Stadler v. Cross, 295 N.W.2d 552
(Minn. 1980); Fournell v. Usher Pest Control Co., 305 N.W.2d 605 (Neb. 1981). These cases
illustrate the physical illness or injury requirement as expressed by courts of different jurisdictions
that employ the zone of danger role.
78. LaCroi, 179 N.W.2d at 390-91; Stadler, 295 N.W.2d at 552; Fournell, 305 N.W.2d at
605.
79. Davies, supra note 54, at 22. Noted authorities on the rule have observed that the "zone
of psychic danger is more extensive than the zone of the foreseeable hazard of physical impact."
Id.
80. 1 MINZER ElrAL., supra note 14, § 5. See also Towns v. Anderson, 579 P.2d 1163 (Colo.
1978); Daley, 179 N.W.2d 390; Orlo v. Connecticut Co., 21 A.2d 402 (Conn. 1941).
81. 1 MINzER Er AL., supra note 14, § 5.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
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Rickey v. Chicago Transit Authority provides an excellent illustration of
the difference between the "impact rule" and the "zone of danger rule." In
Rickey, an eight-year-old witnessed the strangulation of his five-year-old brother
when the younger boy's clothing became entangled in an escalator.'
As a
result of witnessing the accident, the eight-year-old sustained severe mental and
emotional distress, which was manifested in physical injuries, including definite
functional, emotional, psychiatric, and behavioral disorders." Initially, the
Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, dismissed the complaint, holding that no
action for emotional distress caused by another's negligence could exist without
contemporaneous physical impact.' The court reasoned that the "impact rule"
denies recovery to a bystander plaintiff who suffers from mental distress, but
does not suffer the requisite physical impact or injury prior to,' or
contemporaneous with, the distress-inducing event.s"
On appeal, the Illinois Supreme Court abandoned the "impact rule" and
adopted the "zone of danger test. "9 The court stated that a plaintiff bystander,
like the eight-year-old in Rickey, could now recover for mental distress where
the bystander is in the zone of physical danger, and when, as a result of the
defendant's negligence, the plaintiff feared for his or her own safety and
experienced physical illness or injury as a result of the mental distress. 91
Although the adoption of the "zone of danger test" did not raise the issue of
foreseeability in future bystander claims for NIED in the state of Illinois, the
Rickey decision contained factors similar to those already set out in Dillon v.
Legg that had given rise to the foreseeability of bystander injury.'
Inconsistency in the application of the Dillon guidelines by courts in various

85. 457 N.E.2d 1 (111.1983).
86. Id. at 2.
87. Id. The plaintiff suffered from extreme depression, an inability to attend school or to
engage in gainful employment, and an inability to engage in his usual customary affairs. Id.
88. Id. at 1. The trial court, in denying the claim for mental distress, relied on the "impact
rule." Id. at 548-49.
89. Rickey v. Chicago Transit Auth., 457 N.E.2d 1, 3 (111.1983).
90. Id. at 5.
91. Id. The conclusion of the court was grounded on the fact that the plaintiff and the victim
were close relatives. Id. at 4. However, the degree of closeness of their relationship was not
specifically addressed, leaving the question of recovery by nontraditional family members, or other
intimately related plaintiffs, open. Id.
92. Id. at 5. A bystander who is in a zone of physical danger, and who, because of the
defendant's negligence, has reasonable fear for his own safety, is given a right of action for physical
injury or illness resulting from emotional distress. Id. The court refused to allow recovery for
emotional distress alone, holding that such a standard is too vaguely defined and excessively broad,
possibly opening the door to fraudulent claims. Id. Further, using such a standard results in
damages that are difficult to ascertain, since emotional injuries are not foreseeable, and would
encourage frivolous litigation. Id. See infra notes 110-23 and accompanying text for a comparison
to the Dillon factors.
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jurisdictions created the problem of a lack of uniformity in deciding which
bystander may recover, and is the problem which this Note will address.
C. Recent Mechanisms of Recovery Preceding the Bystander Recovery Rule
Traditionally, courts have denied recovery for NIED when the plaintiff has
incurred no physical injury." However, in the last twenty years a growing
number of states have recognized NIED as an independent tort, yet a great deal
of inconsistency exists among state courts in deciding how a plaintiff may
recover for their emotional distress.' Three main types of emotional injuries
have been recognized by the courts.9
The first type includes emotional
injuries resulting from physical impact sustained by the plaintiff." An example
of this type would be a plaintiff that is struck by a defendant and experiences
uneasiness and sleeplessness along with the physical injuries suffered from the
blow.'
The second type of compensable emotional injury is a physical
manifestation of an emotional injury.s In these cases, although the plaintiff
never comes into actual contact with the defendant, the plaintiff suffers
emotional distress which manifests itself in physical injury." An example of

93. See Rickey v. Chicago Transit Auth., 457 N.E.2d 1, 3 (Ill. 1983) (stating that Illinois law
barred recovery absent contemporaneous injury or impact); Weissman v. Wells, 267 S.W. 400, 406
(Mo. 1924) (denying plaintiff recovery for nervous shock absent any physical injury from a collision
of the defendant's streetcar in which the plaintiff was riding); see also W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF
THE LAW OF TORTS § 54, at 328-29 (4th ed. 1971) (noting the general consensus that recovery for
negligent infliction of emotional distress cannot be obtained without an independent tort liability or
accompanying physical injury).
94. Three major limiting tests are used for evaluating claims, depending on the jurisdiction
involved. In at least five remaining states, the so-called "impact rule" still governs the questions
of recovery for emotional distress and is still viable law. In those jurisdictions, a contemporaneous
physical injury or impact must have occurred in order to permit recovery by a bystander. Georgia:
see OB-GYN Assocs. of Albany v. Littleton, 386 S.E.2d 146 (Ga. 1989). Indiana: see Shuamber
v. Henderson, 579 N.E.2d 452 (Ind. 1991). Kansas: see Anderson v. Scheffler, 752 P.2d 667
(Kan. 1988). Kentucky: see Deutsch v. Shein, 597 S.W.2d 141 (Ky. 1980). Oregon: see
Hammond v. Central Lane Communications Ctr., 816 P.2d 593 (Ore. 1991).
The second test that is applied to NIED claims in some jurisdictions is the "zone of danger"
test which is currently followed by 14jurisdictions. See supra note 16, for a list of the jurisdictions
following the "zone of danger" rule.
As a third test, nearly half of the states now allow bystanders outside of the zone of danger
to obtain recovery in certain circumstances for emotional distress brought on by witnessing the injury
or death of a third party that is caused by the defendant's negligence. See supra note 20 for a list
of the jurisdictions following this "relative bystander test." The fact that three different rules are
followed by different states shows the inconsistency of the states in dealing with NIED claims.
95. Richard A. Chesley, Comment, The IncreasinglyDisparate Standards Of Recovery For
Negligently Inflicted Emotional Injuries, 52 U. CIN. L. REv. 1017, 1017 n.l (1983).
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
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this would be a situation in which a pregnant woman suffered severe fright
because of the defendant's action and subsequently miscarried. " Finally, the
last type of recognized emotional injury consists of severe fright, horror, grief,
shame, humiliation, anger, embarrassment, and worry, which may constitute
medically cognizable mental disturbances by the plaintiff without any
accompanying impact or physical injury.'
Emotional injury without impact
or physical injury is the focus of the Bystander Recovery Rule, and is the type
which the law has been addressing with increasing frequency." Development
of the Bystander Recovery Rule has set the stage for the liberalization of
mechanisms of recovery by defining the scope of liability for bystander
harm.m This Section has discussed early modes of recovery that preceded

100. See Hill v.Kimball, 13 S.W. 59 (Tex. 1890).
101. Chesley, supra note 95, at 1017 n.l.
102. See Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 616 P.2d 813, 821 (Cal. 1980). See infra section
I.A.2, notes 124-40 and accompanying text.
103. John David Burley, Dillon Revisited: Toward A Better ParadigmFor Bystander Cases,
43 OHIO ST.L.J 931, 936 (1982). This note focuses only on the treatment of bystander" claimsclaims that arise after the plaintiff
witnessed the harm caused to a third person by the defendant.
Although the Dillon v. Legg decision and its
progeny only deal with NIED to abystander, while the
"impact rule" and "zone of danger rule" can be applied to the direct victim of a negligent act, these
modem theories illustrate the ever expanding reach of recovery for mental distress. Strubbe, supra
note 8, at 978.
An illustration of a direct victim case for recovery of NIED that addressed the recent
expansions for recovery can be found in Boyles v. Kerr, 855 S.W.2d 593 (Tex. 1993). Dan Boyles,
Jr., engaged in sexual intercourse with Susan Leigh Kerr, videotaped the intimate act, and then
showed the tape to 10 friends. Id. at 594. Gossip about the event soon spread, and Kerr got a
reputation of a "porno queen." Id. After being confronted by Kerr, Boyles surrendered the only
copy of the tape. Id. Kerr then filed suit, alleging that she suffered humiliation and severe
emotional distress from the videotape and the gossip surrounding it. Id. Overruling St. Elizabeth
Hosp. v. Garrard, 730 S.W.2d 649 (Tex. 1987), the Texas Supreme Court rejected a cause of action
for the general negligent infliction of emotional distress. Boyles v. Kerr, 855 S.W.2d 593 (Tex.
1993). However, the court did not disturb the status of damages for emotional distress, holding that
such damages for mental anguish are still recoverable in Texas for the commission of many torts.
Id. at 603. Further, the court held that such damages need not be proven by physical manifestation.
Id.
In diverting from the national trend and adopting a more narrow scope of liability, the Texas
Supreme Court retreated from the notion that a general duty exists not to negligently inflict
emotional distress. Id. at 593-98. However, the court held that a claimant may recover mental
anguish damages in connection with the breach of some other legal duty. Id. at 594.
In Boyles, the Texas Supreme Court categorically denied the imposition of the requirement that
emotional distress manifest itself physically in order to be compensable. Id. at 598. Following the
reasoning in Garrard,the court held that the sole purpose of the physical manifestation rule is to
ensure the genuineness of the claim, which makes it both under and overinclusive, with no obvious
relation to emotional harm. Id. The Garrardcourt granted recovery without imposing a physical
manifestation requirement on the plaintiff specifically stating that a claimant may recover without
demonstrating physical manifestation of emotional distress. Id. However, the dissenting opinion
in Boyles accused the majority of diverting Texas from the national trend recognizing the physical
manifestation rule as being outmoded when the court overruled St. Elizabeth Hosp. v. Garrard. Id.
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at 612. However, the dissenting opinion held that the rejection of the physical manifestation
requirement and the ruling in Garrard were insepdrable. Id. The majority clearly demonstrated that
this was not the case, as recovery by the claimant without demonstration of physical manifestation
of emotional distress has long been the rule, even before Garrard. Id. at 598 (citing Leyendecker
& Associates, Inc., v. Wechter, 683 S.W.2d 369, 374 Crex. 1984)).
In Boyles, the court agreed with the holding in Thing v. La Chusa, 771 P.2d 814 (Cal. 1989)
that foreseeability of injury alone is not a useful guideline or restriction on the scope of a NIED
claim. Boyles v. Kerr, 855 S.W.2d 593, 599 (Tex. 1993). Further, reliance on foreseeability of
injury alone in finding a duty, and thus a right to recover, is not adequate when the damages sought
are for an intangible injury. Id. Even the dissent in Boyles recognized that foreseeability of injury
was not adequate to impose liability for unintentionally inflicted emotional distress, and instead
proposed a test that would assess certain restrictions that could be imposed without destroying all
protection against emotional injury. Id. at 600, 615. The restrictions included: 1) The existence
of a legal duty not to cause harm to another beyond that created by foreseeability of injury, such as
that arising from a special relationship, a statutory duty, or from the voluntary undertaking of an
affirmative action that puts another at risk, 2) a breach of the duty by conduct that is reckless,
extreme or outrageous; 3) severe psychic harm; and 4) the foreseeability of a likelihood of such an
injury by a reasonably prudent person. Id. at 615.
The majority in Boyles saw the dissent's "Boyles Rules" as simply another way of saying that
emotional distress is foreseeable, and thus was not an adequate basis on which to impose liability.
Id. at 600. Since the majority and the dissenting judges agreed that foreseeability was not adequate
by itself to recover, an alternative method of defining foreseeability through the "Boyles Rules" was
also inadequate. Id. at 600. Among the duties recognized by the court that Boyles owed to Kerr
were the general duty not to willfully invade another's privacy, and the duty not to intentionally
inflict emotional distress by outrageous conduct. Id. at 600. The court held it unnecessary to
recognize some other "special duty" based on the parties' intimate relationship to provide a basis
for recovery. Id.
In Boyles v. Kerr, it may have been reasonably inferred that the plaintiff intended to plead an
independent cause of action for the willful, malicious, or grossly negligent infliction of emotional
distress. Id. at 601. Kerr's petition asserted that Boyles' conduct was "willful," "malicious," and
.grossly negligent," but these allegations were made only in support of the punitive damages claim,
and not as a separate cause of action. Id. However, the defendants' counsel abandoned her actions
for intentional torts, and brought an action sounding strictly in negligence, for emotional distress and
anguish. Id. Thus, the majority denied recovery, not because Boyles did not breach any duty
toward Kerr, but because the only theory which she chose to assert, that of NIED, was overly broad
and would encompass other cases involving merely rude or insensitive behavior. Id. at 602.
Insurance may also have played a role in Boyles. Id. at 603-04. The court noted that the strategy
taken by the plaintiff to recover damages would be paid by insurance companies for her cause of
action, and therefore the court took action to avoid such an outcome. Id. at 603-04. In Texas, a
homeowner's policy covers only accidents or careless conduct, and excludes intentional acts. Id.
All of the offenses committed by the defendant, such as the positioning of the camera to capture the
event on film, and the showing of the videotape to friends, were intentional acts. Id. at 603-04.
As the defendant's conduct was neither accidental or careless, the plaintiff had a cause of action for
the willful invasion of privacy and the intentional infliction of emotional distress. Id. at 603.
However, Ms. Kerr intentionally gave up her right to receive redress under these theories and
proceeded solely on the tort of the NIED. Id. at 604.
In Boyles v. Kerr, the Texas Supreme Court diverted from the current national trend moving
toward relaxed restrictions for recovery for the NIED. Donna L. Shumate, Tort Law: The
Negligent InflictionofEmotional Distress-ReopeningPandora'sBox- Johnsonv. Ruark Obstetrics,
14 CAMPBELL L. REv. 247, 254 n.57 (1992). However, this diversion-does not overrule a century
of national and Texas case law, as it leaves intact many of the more recent expansions of tort law
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recognition of emotional distress by a bystander that witnessed peril or injury
to another. Section III will examine recovery by a bystander-plaintiff, and the
guidelines used by courts to prevent frivolous claims.
III. BEYOND THE ZONE OF DANGER: EXTENSION OF RECOVERY TO
BYSTANDERS

After the courts recognized the right of a bystander outside of the zone of
danger to recover for NIED, the standards by which a plaintiff could recover
were liberalized."
However, after several years of expansion, some courts
returned to a strict interpretation of the original guidelines. Section A explores
the expansion from Dillon v. Legg"°e which made the first rules for bystander
recovery, to Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals°" and Portee v. Jaffee"
which dispensed with the physical manifestation requirement. Section A
concludes with an analysis of Gates v. Richardson"° which extended bystander
recovery to a larger class of plaintiffs. Section B shows the courts' response to
the expansion in Thing v. La Chusa, °9 with a return to a strict interpretation
of the Dillon rules.
A. Rise of the Bystander Recovery Rule as a Basis of Recovery for NIED.
1. The Dillon Test - Foreseeability Plus Serious Injury
The landmark case that expanded liability beyond the zone of danger rule
was the 1968 case of Dillon v. Legg."' In Dillon, the mother and sister of a
deceased infant each sought damages for emotional distress absent any physical
injury."' The evidence showed that the mother was positioned farther from

concerning NIED. Among such expansions are the possibility of a victim to recover for emotional
anguish in the absence of a physical manifestation, the right of the plaintiff to recover mental anguish
damages caused by the defendant's breach of some other legal duty, or the right of bystanders to
recover emotional distress damages suffered as a result of witnessing a serious or fatal accident. See
supra notes 70-92 and accompanying text.
Even though many of the factors used to determine recovery in bystander cases apply to direct
victim cases as well, the proposed model for recovery in this note utilizes the unique aspects of a
bystander-victim relationship in order to determine recovery. See infra section V, notes 254-96 and
accompanying text. See also infra section I, notes 187-99 for an explanation of the difference in
the treatment of bystanders vs. direct victims by the courts in recent times.
104. See infra sections Ill.A.1-4.

105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

See infra section Ill.A. 1, notes 110-23 and accompanying text.
See infra section III.A.2, notes 124-40 and accompanying text.
See infra section II.A.3, notes 141-53 and accompanying text.
See infra section III.A.4, notes 154-72 and accompanying text.
See infra section EE.B, notes 173-200 and accompanying text.
441 P.2d 912 (Cal. 1968).
Id. at 912.
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the deceased infant than was the daughter."' Thus, the sister of the deceased
was within the zone of danger, while the mother was not."t 3 The California
Supreme Court allowed both plaintiffs to recover damages on the basis that a
duty was owed to the plaintiffs solely because it was foreseeable that they could
suffer emotional distress upon learning of an injury to a close relative."14 The
court held that even though the mother was not in the zone of danger, her close
proximity to the accident allowed recovery.'
The court considered three
factors in determining whether an innocent bystander could recover for NIED:
1) whether the plaintiff was located near the scene of the accident, as contrasted
with a plaintiff who was a distance away from the scene; 2) whether the shock
resulted from the sensory and contemporaneous observance of the accident, as
contrasted with learning of the accident from others after its occurrence; and 3)
whether the plaintiff and the victim were closely related, as contrasted to the
absence of any such intimate relationship. l
These factors became known as the "Dillon Expansion" to the Bystander
Recovery Rule and had a limiting effect on the ability of future plaintiffs to
recover for emotional distress."" As the class of plaintiffs expands, more

112. Id. at 915. Plaintiff's daughter was lawfully crossing a road when defendant's automobile
collided with her, resulting in injuries which proximately caused her death. ld. at 914. The plaintiff
witnessed the accident from a vantage point a few yards farther away than her other daughter, who
witnessed it from the curb. Id. at 915.
113. Id. The facts illustrate the harshness resulting from the artificiality of the zone of danger
rule. If the rule had been applied, the daughter could maintain a cause of action, while the mother
would have been denied recovery. See John David Burley, Dillon Revisited: Toward A Better
ParadigmForBystander Cases, 43 OHIO ST. L.J. 931, 936 (1982).
114. Thing v. La Chusa, 771 P.2d 814, 819 (Cal. 1989) (analyzing the holding in Dillon v.
Legg based on the foreseeability of mental distress).
115. Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912, 912 (Cal. 1968).
116. Davies, supra note 54, at 12 (referring to the foreseeability factors identified in Dillon v.
Legg, 441 P.2d 912, 920 (Cal. 1968)). The Dillon court avoided the fear of fraudulent claims by
noting that emotional distress was a proper element of tort damages in traditional negligence actions
and recently had become an interest protected from intentional wrongs. Dillon, 441 P.2d at 917.
The court found no satisfactory difference between the possibilities for fraud in those cases and in
bystander actions, and proposed limiting liability by examining all of the circumstances of the event,
and setting limits by the reasonably foreseeable consequences of the defendant's act. Id. at 921.
The court followed William Prosser's guidelines, W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS
182 (2d ed. 1955), in developing its three pronged test. Dillon, 441 P.2d at 921.
117. Davies, supra note 54, at 12. Despite the court's expansive opinion, the Dillon rule has
a restrictive dimension. Robert L. Rabin, Ton Recovery ForNegligently Inflicted Economic Loss:
A Reassessment, 37 STAN. L. REv. 1513, 1521 (1985). Professor Rabin noted that the zone of
danger rule reduces the likelihood that certain "collateral" plaintiffs will be permitted to sue. Id.
The other Dillon guidelines, requiring contemporaneous viewing of the negligent act and the
presence at the scene of the accident, further limit recovery because, although many people
experience distress because of an injury to a family member, very few actually view such injuries
as they occur. Davies, supra note 54, at 12. The proposed reasoning model to be discussed in
section V of this note will have a similarly restrictive effect. While the model will expand the class
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limitations are placed on the mechanism of recovery and the plaintiff's ability
to qualify for relief."" This rule was considerably more expansive than the
"zone of danger test," and several other jurisdictions have made use of the
"Dillon expansion" since it was first formulated by the California Supreme
Court.

19

Massachusetts, however, went one step further than the Dillon court. In
Dziokonsli v. Babineau,' the Supreme Court of Massachusetts allowed a
cause of action for mental distress without any sensory perception of the event,
as required by Dillon.'2 1 The Dziokonski decision represented the most liberal
interpretation of Dillon to date in terms of the contemporaneous observance
requirement, however the bystanders in Dziokonski had the contributing factor
of strong physical manifestations that resulted in their death.2' Although
Dillon v. Legg may seem more restrictive than subsequent cases such as
Dziokonski, it stands as a major step in the long search for a better rule with
which to govern bystander liability."n Section III.A.2 presents a further

of plaintiffs eligible to recover, it will require more qualifying factors as the plaintiff-victim
relationship becomes more distant. See infra section V, notes 254-96 and accompanying text.
118. See generally Rabin, supra note 117.
119. Rhode Island: see D'Ambra v. United States, 338 A.2d 524 (R.I. 1975); Hawaii: see
Leong v. Takasaki, 520 P.2d 758 (Haw. 1974); Michigan: see Toms v. McConnell, 207 N.W.2d
140 (Mich. Ct. App. 1973). See infra note 179 for a more complete listing of cases that followed
or expanded upon the Dillon guidelines. The Dillon rule is more expansive in that it allows a
bystander to recover as an entirely new class of plaintiff, however it is restrictive to all classes by
requiring contemporaneous viewing of the accident and presence on the scene. See supra note 117.
120. 380 N.E.2d 1295 (Mass. 1978).
121. Id. at 1302. In Dziokonski, the administratrix of the estates of a husband and wife brought
an action alleging that the deaths of husband and wife were the result of physical injuries caused by
emotional distress which was brought on by injuries to the child of the couple. Id. at 1296. The
child was struck by the defendant's school bus. Id. The mother went to the scene of the accident
and witnessed her daughter lying injured on the ground. Id. The mother died while riding with her
child in an ambulance, allegedly as a result of physical and emotional shock brought about by the
injuries to her daughter. Id. The father, upon learning of the death of his wife, also died, allegedly
from an aggravated ulcer, coronary occlusion, and emotional shock. Id. The court held that the
action was valid. Id.
122. See supra note 121 and accompanying text. The facts of Dziokonski illustrate the Dillon
view of examining "all the circumstances." Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912, 921 (Cal. 1968). As
one element of damage (physical manifestation) becomes more important, other elements
(contemporaneous observance) become less significant. See infra section V, notes 254-96 and
accompanying text. The proposed model solution of this note uses a similar balancing approach,
by applying criteria that different courts have deemed important in the past to determine who should
recover. See infra note 258.
123. "In short, the history of the cases does not show the development of a logical rule but
rather a series of changes and abandonments." Dillon, 441 P.2d at 924. Dillon remains the seminal
case cited in most jurisdictions that have expanded the scope of bystander recovery. See, e.g.,
Barnhill v. Davis, 300 N.W.2d 104, 106 (Iowa 1981).
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liberalization of the Dillon guidelines by retraction of the physical manifestation
requirement.
2. Molien Abrogates the Physical Manifestation Requirement
Originally, Dillon required some physical manifestation of the plaintiff's
emotional distress; however, the courts were eventually confronted with
arguments for the abandonment of the physical manifestation requirement as a
limitation on recovery for mental anguish damages." 2 In Molien v. Kaiser
Foundation Hospitals,"u a physician erroneously diagnosed a woman's
condition as syphilis and advised her to have her husband examined for the
disease."
The tests revealed that the husband did not have the disease." z
As a result of the erroneous diagnosis, the wife suspected her husband of
engaging in extramarital sexual activities, which led to the break-up of their
marriage and the initiation of divorce proceedings."l
The husband brought
an action against the hospital for NIED due to the misdiagnosis of his wife by
the hospital."' Faced with the question of whether the plaintiff was barred
from recovery by the fact that he had suffered no physical injury, the Supreme
Court of California held that the risk of harm to the plaintiff was reasonably
foreseeable." m The court reasoned that he was a foreseeable victim of the

124. St. Elizabeth Hosp. v. Garrard, 730 S.W.2d 649, 652 (rex. 1987).

The following

jurisdictions have rejected the physical manifestation requirement as a limitation on recovery for
mental anguish damages: Taylor v. Baptist Medical Ctr., Inc., 400 So. 2d 369, 374 (Ala. 1981);

Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 616 P.2d 813, 817 (Cal. 1980); Montinieri v. Southern New
England Tel. Co., 398 A.2d 1180, 1184 (Conn. 1978); Rodrigues v. State, 472 P.2d 509, 519

(Haw. 1970); Barnhill v. Davis, 300 N.W.2d 104, 108 (Iowa 1981); Culbert v. Sampson's
Supermarkets, Inc., 444 A.2d 433, 438 (Me. 1982); Bass v. Nooney Co., 646 S.W.2d 765, 772
(Mo. 1983); Johnson v. Supersave Markets, Inc., 686 P.2d 209, 213 (Mont. 1984); James v. Lieb,
375 N.W.2d 109, 116 (Neb. 1985); Portee v. Jaffee, 417 A.2d 521, 526 (N.J. 1980); Schultz v.
Barberton Glass Co., 447 N.E.2d 109, 113 (Ohio 1983); Sinn v. Burd, 404 A.2d 672, 679 (Pa.
1979); Chappetta v. Bowman Tranap., Inc., 415 So. 2d 1019, 1022-23 (La. Ct. App. 1982).
Writers on the subject indicate that the physical manifestation requirement is destined for
extinction. See generally Edward A. McCarthy, Illinois Law in Distress: The "Zone Of Danger"
And "PhysicalInjury" Rules in Emotional Distress Litigation, 19 J. MARsHALL L. REV. 17 (1985);
John E. Flanagan, Comment, Negligent Infliction Of Emotional Distress: A Proposal For A
Recognized Tort Action, 67 MARQ. L. REv. 557 (1984). However, this note advocates the use of
the physical manifestation requirement as a contributing factor to qualify for bystander recovery in
the absence of a spousal, blood or adoptive relationship. See infra section V, notes 254-96 and
accompanying text.
125. 616 P.2d 813 (Cal. 1980).
126. Id. at 814.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 814-15.
129. Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 616 P.2d 813, 814-15 (Cal. 1980).
130. Id. at 817.
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negligent diagnosis of his spouse. 3' Further, the court held the plaintiff to be
With regard to the
a direct victim of the defendant's negligent diagnosis.
seriousness of the plaintiff's injury, the court agreed with the standard adopted
by the court in Rodrigues v. State, 33 which limited recovery to claims of
serious mental distress based upon the reaction of the reasonable person, thereby
avoiding potentially unlimited liability for invasions of emotional tranquility that
are trivial and transient.14
The court in Molien stated that the seriousness of the mental distress was
a question of proof to be presented to the trier of fact, and that it would usurp
the jury's function to screen claims on that basis at the pleading stage. 135 By
leaving the question of serious emotional distress, and thus injury, to the jury,
the court in Molien condemned the physical manifestation requirement as an
artificial device, the sole purpose of which was to guarantee the genuineness of
the claim for mental injury. I" Therefore, the Molien court eliminated the
physical manifestation requirement, reasoning that no valid line could be drawn
between the physical and the psychological. '3' Thus, the plaintiff need only
prove the severity of his or her distress." Though the Molien decision was
applied to a direct victim, rather than to a bystander, it showed the court's
willingness to apply the general principal of foreseeability from Dillon to the
facts at hand, just as in other cases presenting complex questions of tort
liability.139 Significantly, Section III.A.3 shows the similar approach taken by

131. Id.

132. Id. (holding that the tortious conduct of the defendant was directed to the plaintiff-husband
as well as to his wife, and that the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty to exercise due care in
diagnosing the physical condition of his wife).
133. 472 P.2d 509, 520 (Haw. 1970).
134. Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 616 P.2d 813, 819 (Cal. 1980) (citing Rodrigues v.
State, 472 P.2d 509, 520 (Haw. 1970)). The Molien court adopted as its standard that "serious
mental distress may be found where a reasonable [person], normally constituted, would be unable
to adequately cope with the mental stress engendered by the circumstances of the case." Molien,
616 P.2d at 819-20. (quoting Rodrigues v. State, 472 P.2d 509, 520 (Haw. 1970)). The court in
Rodrigues reasoned that liability of a defendant to the plaintiff for serious mental distress is best
determined by application of general tort principles. Rodrigues, 472 P.2d at 519. The fact that a
California court relied on Hawaiian law shows the need for a consistent set of guidelines that can
be used from state to state which is provided in section V of this note.
135. Molien, 616 P.2d at 821.
136. Id. at 819-21.
137. Id. at 820-21.
138. Molien v. Kaiser, 616 P.2d 813, 820-21 (Cal. 1980) (holding that the essential question
is one of proof; whether the plaintiff has suffered a serious and compensable injury should not turn
on the artificial and often arbitrary classification scheme of whether an injury is physical or
psychological).
139. See, e.g., Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976) (holding that
the significance of Dillon for the present action lies not in its delineation of guidelines fashioned for
the resolution of the precise issue before them, but in the application of its general principle of
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the Supreme Court of New Jersey to a true bystander case resulting in the
further expansion of Bystander Recovery for NIED." °
3. Portee v. Jaffee: Bystander Recovery without Physical Manifestation
Although Molien is most often used to illustrate the express elimination of
the physical manifestation requirement in recovery for NIED, in Portee v.
Jaffee"" the Supreme Court of New Jersey also abrogated the physical
manifestation requirement. 42 The decision, made shortly before Molien, was
a case in which the plaintiff's injuries were even less obvious. 43 In Portee,
a mother suffered emotional trauma as a result of watching her seven-year-old
son suffer a slow and agonizing death after becoming trapped in an elevator. '"
The court upheld the mother's right to bring a negligence action for the
infliction of emotional injury against the landlord and the elevator company,
even though she had not been subjected to any risk of physical harm."
Unlike the plaintiff in Molien, the plaintiff in Portee was more of a witness to
an act of negligence, rather than a direct victim."t
The court in Portee
adopted a standard similar to that in Dillon."7 The court set out a four-factor
test for determining a cause of action for NIED."s For a bystander-claimant
to prevail under Portee, the claimant must demonstrate: (1) the death or serious
physical injury of another caused by defendant's negligence; (2) a marital or
intimate, familial relationship between the plaintiff and the injured person; (3)
observation of the death or injury at the scene of the accident; and (4) "resulting
severe emotional distress.'1 49
The court in Portee emphasized the existence of an intimate familial
relationship between the plaintiff and the victim as the basis for recovery."

foresecability to the facts at hand).
140. Portee v. Jaffee, 417 A.2d 521 (N.J. 1980). See infra section m.A.3, notes 141-53 and
accompanying text.
141. 417 A.2d 521 (N.J. 1980).
142. Id. at 524-27. The question was whether liability should exist where there was no
potential for personal injury, except for the distress resulting from perceiving the negligently
inflicted injuries of another. Id.
143. Id. at 526-27 (holding that the instinctive affection of a mother for her seven-year-old son
would be a sufficiently intimate bond on which to predicate liability).
144. Id. at 522-23.
145. Portee v. Jaffee, 417 A.2d 521, 528 (N.J. 1980).
146. Id. at 522-23.
147. Id. at 527-28.
148. Id. at 528.
149. Portee v. Jaffe, 417 A.2d 521, 528 (N.J. 1980).
150. ld. at 526-28. In requiring that the plaintiff be closely related to the injured person, the
court found the existence of a close relationship to be the most crucial element of its four factor test.
Id.
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The court recognized that the presence of deep intimate familial ties between the
plaintiff and the physically injured person renders the harm to emotional
tranquility serious and compelling."' The court reasoned that the suffering
that arises from such harm contrasts greatly with the average setbacks of
everyday life as well as with the apprehension of harm to another, less intimate
person. 5 2 The court concluded that the existence of a marital or intimate
familial relationship is an essential element of a cause of action for NIED.'
Thus, the significance of Dillon and its progeny is that while the "impact rule"
and "zone of danger rule" typically allow damages only to the direct victim of
a negligent act, the foreseeability factors of Dillon and Portee allow damages for
NIED to bystanders, illustrating the ever expanding reach of recovery for mental
distress.
Accordingly, as the scope of bystander recovery enlarged, it
encompassed a larger class of plaintiffs.
4. Gates v. Richardson: Expansion of the Class of Plaintiffs
The passage of time and several "bystander" type actions led at least one
court to go one step further in the case of Gates v. Richardson." In Gates,

151. Id. at 526-27.
152. Id. at 527.
153. Portee v. Jaffe, 417 A.2d 521, 526-27 (N.J. 1980). The analysis of the interest in
emotional tranquility founded on parental love indicates where the court's limits of liability lie. Id.
154. 719 P.2d 193 (Wyo. 1986). In the 18 years from Dillon v. Legg to the Gates decision,
many state courts had accepted the proposition that a defendant's duty of care should extend to, at
least, to some plaintiffs who suffer purely mental injuries. Through 1986, the impact rule had been
abolished in the following states: Alabama: see Alabama Fuel & Iron Co. v. Baladoni, 73 So. 205
(Ala. Ct. App. 1916); Arizona: see City of Tucson v. Wondergem, 466 P.2d 383 (Ariz. 1970);
California: see Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912 (Cal. 1968); Colorado: see Towns v. Anderson, 579
P.2d 1163 (Colo. 1978); Connecticut: see Oro v. Connecticut Co., 21 A.2d 402 (Conn. 1941);
Delaware: see Robb v. Pennsylvania R.R., 210 A.2d 709 (Del. 1965); Georgia: see Goddard v.
Watters, 82 S.E. 304 (Ga. Ct. App. 1914); Hawaii: see Rodrigues v. State, 472 P.2d 509 (Haw.
1970); Illinois: see Rickey v. Chicago Transit Auth., 457 N.E.2d 1 (111. 1983); Iowa: see Watson
v. Dilts, 89 N.W. 1068 (Iowa 1902); Kansas: see Clemm v. Atchison, Topeka & S.F. Ry., 268
P. 103 (Kan. 1928); Louisiana: Stewart v. Arkansas S.R.R., 36 So. 676 (La. 1904); Maine:
Wallace v. Coca-Cola Bottling Plants, Inc., 269 A.2d 117 (Me. 1970), overruled on othergrounds,
Culbert v. Sampson's Supermarkets, Inc., 444 A.2d 433 (Me. 1982); Maryland: Green v. T.A.
Shoemaker & Co., 73 A. 688 (Md. 1909); Massachusetts: Dziokonski v. Babineau, 380 N.E.2d
1295 (Mass. 1978); Michigan: Daley v. LaCroix, 179 N.W.2d 390 (Mich. 1970); Minnesota:
Purcell v. St. Paul City Ry., 50 N.W. 1034 (Minn. 1892); Mississippi: First Nat'l Bank v.
Langley, 314 So. 2d 324 (Miss. 1975); Missouri: Bass v. Nooney Co., 646 S.W.2d 765 (Mo.
1983); Nebraska: Rasmussenv. Benson, 280 N.W. 890 (Neb. 1938); New Hampshire: Chiuchiolo
v. New England Wholesale Tailors, 150 A. 540 (N.H. 1930); New Jersey: Falzone v. Busch, 214
A.2d 12 (N.J. 1965); New York: Battalla v. State, 176 N.E.2d 729 (N.Y. 1961); North Carolina:
Kimberly v. Howland, 55 S.E. 778 (N.C. 1906); North Dakota: Whetham v. Bismarck Hosp., 197
N.W.2d 678 (N.D. 1972); Ohio: Schultz v. Barberton Glass Co., 447 N.E.2d 109 (Ohio 1983);
Oklahoma: St. Louis & S.F. Ry. v. Keiffer, 150 P. 1026 (Okla. 1915); Oregon: Salmi v.
Columbia & N.R.R., 146 P. 819 (Or. 1915); Pennsylvania: Niederman v. Brodsky, 261 A.2d 84
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the plaintiff brought an action for the negligent infliction of emotional distress
following an accident where the defendant's automobile collided with a bicycle
ridden by the plaintiff's child.155 While the plaintiff did not actually see the
accident, she arrived moments after it occurred and found her child injured and
bleeding." 56 While the plaintiff was never in the zone of danger, her presence
at the scene following the accident resulted in profound emotional shock.' 57
Rejecting the impact rule, the Supreme Court of Wyoming held that there was
a duty imposed on a defendant to avoid negligent impacts and threats of an
impact on another." s Furthermore, if this duty was breached, then the
defendant was liable for both mental and physical harm.'59
In the case of the "impact rule," there was no duty regarding negligent acts
which caused purely mental harm where there was no impact or threat of impact
upon someone in the zone of danger. 6 Instead, the Gates court held that the
tort of NIED was actionable under the following limitations: 1) the class of
plaintiffs who may bring action for NIED consists of those who could bring an
action for wrongful death of the primary victim; 2) the primary victim must die
or suffer serious bodily injury, as that term is defined in the Wyoming Criminal
Code; 61 3) the plaintiff must observe either the infliction of the fatal or
harmful blow or observe the aftermath of the occurrence without material
change in the condition and location of the victim; and 4) once the previous
three conditions are satisfied, the case can go forward under normal negligence
principles which will compensate the plaintiff for his entire damage so that the
plaintiff is made whole. 62 The Gates decision stressed the nature of the
relationship between the plaintiff and the victim, rather than the requirement of

(Pa. 1970); Rhode Island: Simone v. Rhode Island Co., 66 A. 202 (R.I. 1907); South Carolina:
Mack v. South-Bound R. Co., 29 S.E. 905 (S.C. 1898); South Dakota: Sternhagen v. Kozel, 167
N.W. 398 (S.D. 1918); Tennessee: Memphis St. Ry. Co. v. Bernstein, 194 S.W. 902 (Tenn.
1917); Texas: Hill v. Kimball, 13 S.W. 59 (Tex. 1890); Vermont: Savard v. Cody Chevrolet,
Inc., 234 A.2d 656 (Vt. 1963); Virginia: Hughes v. Moore, 197 S.E.2d 214 (Va. 1973);
Washington: Frazee v. Western Dairy Products, 47 P.2d 1037 (Wash. 1935); West Virginia:
Lambert v. Brewster, 125 S.E. 244 (W.Va. 1924); Wisconsin: Pankopf v. Hinkley, 123 N.W. 625
(Wis. 1909). For a listing of states that are still clinging to the impact rule, see supra note 94.
155. Gates, 719 P.2d at 194.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Gates v. Richardson, 719 P.2d 193 (Wyo. 1986).
159. Id. at 195. See also Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co., 379 P.2d 513 (Cal. 1963)
(rejecting the "impact test" in favor of the "zone-of-danger" rule).
160. Gates, 719 P.2d at 195.
161. WYO. STAT. §§ 1-38-102, 2-4-101 (1977 & Supp. 1995). The legislature has expressed
the policy that spouses, children, parents, and siblings may recover for wrongful death. Id. Sibling
recovery had not been specifically addressed by the Wyoming courts, thus the decision that the
wrongful death statute defined the class of plaintiffs who may recover could be viewed as an
expansion of the bystander recovery rule. Gates v. Richardson, 719 P.2d 193, 195 (Wyo. 1986).
162. Gates, 719 P.2d at 200-01.
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a physical injury to justify an award of damages for the NIED. Further, the
Gates court expanded bystander recovery to a broader class of plaintiffs and no
longer required contemporaneous sensory perception of the accident."t
Recently, the Supreme Court of Texas applied the courts' reasoning from
Dillon, Molien, and Gates, and allowed recovery absent physical manifestations
of injury, as well as when the plaintiff did not actually witness the event causing
6
the mental distress."
In Saint Elizabeth Hospital v. Garrard,"
a patient
and her husband sought damages for mental anguish after their stillborn
daughter's body was disposed of in an unmarked, common grave without their
knowledge or consent."' The Garrards sought damages only for their mental
anguish, and did not plead any facts suggesting that their mental anguish
manifested itself physically. 67 Expanding on prior decisions such as Gates,
the Supreme Court of Texas held that proof of physical injury was no longer
required in order to recover for the NIED."
By eliminating the physical
manifestation requirement, Texas joined a growing number of states which
recognize the tort of negligent infliction of mental anguish without imposing
arbitrary restrictions." 6 The court concluded that the distinction between
physical injury and emotional distress was no longer defensible."' The court

163. Id. at 198-99 (following the Wyoming wrongful death statute which expanded the plaintiff
class beyond parent-child relationships, and allowing the plaintiff to recover for observance of the
accident scene shortly after its occurrence, but without material change in the condition and location
of the victim).
164. See supra notes 110-40 and accompanying text (discussing the holdings in Dillon and
Molien) and notes 154-63 and accompanying text (discussing the holding in Gates).
165. 730 S.W.2d 649 (Tex. 1987).
166. Id. at 649. Recovery for the mishandling of a corpse shows that even the Dillon guideline
of death or serious injury to the victim is not always necessary. Section V of this note will provide
a grading system that will allow for instances where any one of the "Dillon factors" can be absent,
but recovery may still be had by the plaintiff.
167. Id. at 650.
168. Id.
169. Saint Elizabeth Hosp. v. Garrard, 730 S.W.2d 649, 654 n.6 (Tex. 1987). For a listing
of other states that have rejected the physical impact requirement, see supra note 154.
170. Id. at 653-54 (defending peace of mind when the facts are deemed sufficient to guarantee
the genuineness of the claim in the absence of physical manifestations of the mental injury). See
Moore v. Lillebo, 722 S.W.2d 683, 685 (rex. 1986) ("Mental anguish inheres in the nature of
certain torts . . . ."); Billings v. Atkinson, 489 S.W.2d 858 (Tex. 1973) (mental suffering damages
recoverable for the willful invasion of privacy); Fisher v. Carrousel Motor Hotel, Inc., 424 S.W.2d
627 (rex. 1967) (mental suffering damages recoverable for intentional battery); Farmers &
Merchants State Bank of Krum v. Ferguson, 617 S.W.2d 918 (rex. 1981) (mental anguish damages
allowed for the wrongful dishonor of checks with malicious intent); Stuart v. Western Union Tel.
Co., 18 S.W. 351 (rex. 1885) (allowing recovery for mental anguish damages for a negligently
delivered death message); Classen v. Benfer, 144 S.W.2d 633 (rex. Civ. App. 1940) (holding
mental anguish damages recoverable after the mishandling of a corpse). The Garrardcourt held the
physical manifestation requirement as an unwarranted restriction on the right to seek redress for
NIED, and thereby joined an established trend in American jurisprudence. Garrard,730 S.W.2d
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reasoned that the problem was one of proof, and that the best interests of the
public would not be served by denying a remedy in all cases simply because
some claims might be false, as such a policy would lead to arbitrary results.'
As Section III.B will show, while some courts removed barriers to recovery
such as the physical manifestation and contemporaneous observation
requirements, other courts, such as the California Supreme Court in Thing v. La
7
Chusa"
' reinforced them, resulting in the lack of consistency which this Note
endeavors to resolve.
B. Thing v. La Chusa: A Restriction On The Dillon Expansion
As expansion of the cause of action for NIED continued, subsequent court
decisions have created more uncertainty. " Just as the "zone of danger"
limitation was abandoned in Dillon as an arbitrary restriction on recovery, the
Dillon factors have been relaxed on grounds that they too have created arbitrary
limits on recovery. 74 Recognizing that the physical manifestation requirement
had also been abandoned, the Supreme Court of California, in Thing v. La
Chusa, 73 gave consideration to the importance of avoiding the limitless
exposure to liability of the pure foreseeability test, which had been adopted by
a number of other jurisdictions. 76 In Thing, a child was struck by an
automobile while his mother was nearby, but the mother neither saw nor heard
the accident." 7 The mother became aware of her son's injury through her
daughter. '
A series of California decisions had held that visual perception of an
accident was not required to recover for NIED. I" Thus, California courts

at 654.
171. Garrard,730 S.W.2d at 654.
172. 771 P.2d 814, 821 (Cal. 1989).
173. See infra note 179, for a discussion of the recent inconsistent court decisions regarding
NIED.
174. Thing v. La Chusa, 771 P.2d 814, 821 (Cal. 1989).
175. Id. at 817.
176. Id. at 817-21.
177. Id. at 815.
178. Thing v. La Chusa, 771 P.2d 814, 815 (Cal. 1989). The plaintiff was told by her
daughter that her son had just been struck by a car. Id. "She rushed to the scene where she saw
her bloody and unconscious child, whom she believed was dead, lying in the roadway." Id.
179. See Krouse v. Graham, 562 P.2d 1022, 1030 (Cal. 1977) (holding that the plaintiff in a
negligent infliction of emotional distress case need not "visually" perceive the third party injury to
satisfy the Dillon guideline suggesting that the plaintiff suffer shock from "'the sensory and
contemporaneousobservance of the accident, . . .'"); Archibald v. Braverman, 79 Cal. Rptr. 723,
724 (Cal. Ct. App. 1969) (holding that visual perception of the accident was not required, and
recovery was allowed by a mother who "did not actually witness the tort but viewed the child's
injuries within moments after the occurrence of the injury-producing event"). C. Hoyem v.
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concluded that persons who were not present at the accident scene could recover
damages for the emotional distress they later suffered when informed by others
The
of the injury to their loved ones or upon their arrival at the scene."
Thing court sought to rectify the conflicting and sometimes arbitrary attempts by
the lower courts to apply Dillon and Molien, and concluded that bystander
recovery of damages for NIED are limited by traditional concepts of tort law,
as well as by the societal benefits of certainty in the law.'
The court in Thing devised a three element test for recovery of damages for
emotional distress caused by observing the negligent infliction of injury upon a
third party." Under Thing, the plaintiff may recover if: 1) the plaintiff is
closely related to the injured victim; 2) the plaintiff is present at the scene
of the injury-producing event at the time it occurs and is then aware that it is
causing injury to the victim; and 3) the plaintiff suffers serious emotional
distress beyond that which would be anticipated in a disinterested witness, and
An
which is not an abnormal response under the circumstances.'
examination of the holding in Thing indicates that a merely negligent actor will
not owe a legally recognized duty to make monetary amends to all persons who
may have suffered emotional distress on viewing or learning about the injurious

Manhattan Beach City Sch. Dist., 585 P.2d 851 (Cal. 1978) (reaffirming the requirement that the
shock or emotional distress necessary to a cause of action for NEED under Dillon must result from
a direct emotional impact on the plaintiff caused by the sensory and contemporaneous observance
of the accident); But see Nazaroff v. Superior Court, 145 Cal Rptr. 657 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978)
(broadening the concept of contemporaneous observance). The California Court of Appeals noted
that a mother who, while searching for her missing three-year-old child, heard a neighbor scream
his name and realized that the child must have fallen into the neighbor's pool. Id. at 662. The
mother saw the child being pulled from the pool and given cardiopulmonary resuscitation as she ran
up. Id. at 659. The court held that she could state a cause of action under Dillon. Id. at 663. The
court reasoned that it was not necessary that the plaintiff perceive the accident if she suffered
physical harm that resulted from the "direct emotional impact from the contemporaneousobservation
of the immediate consequences of the defendants' negligent act, which was the proximate cause of
the injury and death of her son." Id. at 664. The Nazaroffdecision no longer considered sensory
perception of an accident to be a prerequisite to recovery, however, ". . . the plaintiff who had
witnessed the immediate consequences of an injury producing incident [must] suffer emotional
distress sufficient to result in physical injury." Thing v. La Chusa, 771 P.2d 814, 822 (Cal. 1989).
180. See supra note 179.
181. Thing, 771 P.2d at 815. The court resolved some of the uncertainty over the parameters
of the NIED action by devising a three element test. Id. See infra notes 182-83 and accompanying
text.
182. Thing, 771 P.2d at 829-30.
183. Id. at 829. This requirement is significantly broader than the "familial relationship"
requirement specified by other courts and includes relatives residing in the same household, or
parents, siblings, children and grandparents. Id. at 829 n. 10. See infra section V, notes 254-96 and
accompanying text for the proposed solution to the dilemma of determining how closely related a
bystander-plaintiff must be to recover for emotional damages.
184. Thing v. La Chusa, 771 P.2d 814, 829-30 (Cal. 1989).
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consequences of the tortfeasor's conduct."8 5 The significance of the court's
decision in Thing is that it refined the guidelines enunciated by the same court
in Dillon v. Legg to create greater certainty in bystander recovery actions. 1
The court refused to distinguish between bystander and direct victim NIED
actions, holding bystanders to the same contemporaneous standard as direct
victims, and leaving any distinctions for future courts."8 7
"The distinction between the 'bystander' and 'direct victim' cases is found
in the source of the duty owed by the defendant to the plaintiff. "
Since
bystander liability is premised upon the defendant's violation of a duty not to
negligently cause emotional distress to people who observe conduct which causes
harm to another, the limits set forth in Thing for bystander liability have no
application in "direct victim" cases.'
In Burgess v. Superior Court," the
California Supreme Court carved out a distinction between bystanders and direct
victims in NIED cases.' 9' In Burgess, the plaintiff's newborn infant was
deprived of oxygen for forty-four minutes during delivery while the doctor
arranged for emergency surgery.' 2 The plaintiff sued for recovery of
damages for NIED. " The defendant was granted summary judgment by the
trial court which relied on the bystander theory of Thing.'" The appellate
court held that Thing was not controlling under the facts of the case because

185. Id. at 830.
186. Id. at 815. Significantly, the Thing court viewed the post-Dillon decisions, which allowed
recovery without the plaintiff present at the scene of the injury, as creating limitless liability through
the use of a pure foreseeability test of "duty," and instead chose to follow a stricter standard
requiring contemporaneous observance of the accident. Id. at 821. Thus, the Thing case reaffirms
the need for a recovery model that will fulfill the promise of Dillon, and further define the
parameters of the tort of NIED.
187. Id. at 825. (holding that recovery is permitted if the plaintiff observes both the
defendant's conduct and the resultant injury, and is aware at that time that the conduct is causing
the injury). Id. (referring to the decision in Ochoa v. Superior Court, 703 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1985)).
188. Burgess v. Superior Court, 831 P.2d 1197, 1200 (Cal. 1992) (stating that "bystander
liability is premised upon a defendant's violation of a duty not to negligently cause emotional distress
to people who observe conduct which causes harm to another"). In contrast, the "direct victim"
label is used to distinguish cases in which damages for serious emotional distress are sought as a
result of a breach of duty owed the plaintiff that is "assumed by the defendant or imposed on the
defendant as a matter of law, or that arises out of a relationship between the two." Marlene F. v.
Affiliated Psychiatric Medical Clinic, Inc., 770 P.2d 278, 282 (Cal. 1989). For a complete
discussion of a recent direct victim case, see Boyles v. Kerr, supra note 103.
189. Burgess, 831 P.2d at 1200. See supra note 188.
190. Burgess, 831 P.2d at 1197.
191. Id.
192. Burgess v. Superior Court, 831 P.2d 1197, 1199 (Cal. 1992).
193. Id.
194. Id. at 1199. See supra notes 173-200and accompanyingtext fora full discussion of Thing
v. La Chusa, 771 P.2d 814 (Cal. 1989).
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Burgess was a "direct victim" rather than a "bystander. " "s The Supreme
Court of California affirmed, reasoning that the distinction between the
"bystander" and "direct victim" cases is found in the source of the duty owed
by the defendant to the plaintiff.'" Similar to the holding in Molien,' 97 the
court reasoned that a doctor owed a direct duty to a patient that is assumed or
imposed as a matter of law, or that arises out of a relationship between the
two.'" Thus, the Burgess court recognized the "sound" principles of Molien,
that damages for NIED may be recovered absent physical injury or impact, and,
notwithstanding the criteria imposed upon recovery by bystanders, in cases of
This Section has
a breach of duty arising from a preexisting relationship.'
identified various factors that courts have used to decide when a bystander who
is a close family member and outside of the zone.of danger may recover for
NIED. Obviously, there is no cohesiveness among the courts as exemplified by

195. Burgess, 831 P.2d at 1199 (defining the bystander theory in terms of a defendant's
violation of a duty not to negligently cause emotional distress to people who observe conduct which
causes harm to another). For a complete discussion of a direct victim case, see supra note 103.
196. Burgess v. Superior Court, 831 P.2d 1197, 1200 (Cal. 1992).
197. See supra section III.A.2, notes 124-40 and accompanying text.
198. Burgess, 831 P.2d at 1201. See also Marlene F. v. Affiliated Psychiatric Medical Clinic,
Inc., 770 P.2d 278, 282 (Cal. 1989) (holding that professional relationship between psychiatrist and
patient imposed a duty on the defendant as a matter of law).
199. Burgess, 831 P.2d at 1201. In cases where a duty arising from a preexisting relationship
is negligently breached, the injured party constitutes a direct victim. Id. Confusion has reigned in
cases involving family relationships and medical treatment as to whether and under which "theory"
plaintiffs may seek damages for NIED. See Ochoa v. Superior Court, 703 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1985)
(permitting recovery by parents on a "bystander theory," rather than a "direct victim theory," as
a result of the parents' observation of the defendants' failure to treat their deathly ill child); Schwartz
v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 276 Cal. Rptr. 470 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990) (denying recovery to a
father for the refusal of child's therapist to provide the father with information about the child's
whereabouts); Golstein v. Superior Court, 273 Cal. Rptr. 270 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990) (denying parents
recovery of damages for emotional distress based upon lack of contemporaneous knowledge of their
child's injury arising from administering an overdose of radiation to the child); Hurlbut v. Sonora
Community Hosp., 254 Cal. Rptr. 840 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (reversing judgment for parents who
recovered damages for emotional distress solely under the bystander theory arising from an injury
to their child during labor and delivery); Martinez v. County of Los Angeles, 231 Cal. Rptr. 96
(Cal. Ct. App. 1986) (denying recovery to parents for "restructuring life" to care for child injured
at birth); Newton v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 228 Cal. Rptr. 890 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986) (permitting
parents of child left partially paralyzed during birth to plead entitlement to damages for emotional
distress); Andalon v. Superior Court, 208 Cal. Rptr. 899 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) (permitting recovery
by parents for failure to diagnose Down's syndrome in child prior to birth); Wiggins v. Royale
Convalescent Hosp., 206 Cal. Rptr. 2 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) (denying recovery of damages for
emotional distress to wife for convalescenthome's failure to prevent husband's injurious fall); Sesma
v. Cueto, 181 Cal. Rptr. 12 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982) (finding a question of fact sufficient to warrant
trial of mother's claim for damages for emotional distress arising out of death of child at birth);
Johnsonv. Superior Court, 177 Cal. Rptr. 63 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981) (permitting mother to state claim
for emotional distress resulting from stillbirth as part of her medical malpractice claim). These cases
illustrate the need for concrete guidelines to determine if a preexisting relationship between the
doctor and the parent of the victim will preclude recovery by the parent as a bystander.
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the cases discussed in Section III. Section IV will introduce the recent decision
of Dunphy v. Gregor' to show the current trend toward recovery for nonfamily members, and the inapplicability of a bright-line rule to determine who
may recover. Further, Section IV surveys the policy considerations surrounding
the debate over further expansion of bystander recovery.
IV. RECENT EXPANSION OF THE BYSTANDER RECOVERY RULE

In recent years, courts have further expanded recovery for NIED to even
non-family members by crafting a two-tiered analysis." ° First, the claim must
prove the four standard elements for negligence:
1) that the defendant owed a duty of care to the bystander-plaintiff;
2) that the defendant's conduct fell below the applicable standard of
care; 3) that the bystander-plaintiff was injured; and 4) that the
defendant's conduct caused the injury.'
Second, the claim must
meet a public policy interest in preventing cases that are not
"authentic" and in placing a fair burden on defendants.'
To meet
the public policy burden, a [NIED] claim must involve a victim who
was killed or seriously injured; [a] bystander [who is] a close family
member of the victim; and [a] bystander [who] viewed either the event
that injured the victim or its immediate aftermath.'
Recently this two-tiered analysis has been expanded to allow for recovery in the
5
case of a close, intimate, non-family relationship.2
A. Dunphy v. Gregor - Expansion Beyond the Immediate Family
In Dunphy v. Gregor," the New Jersey courts expanded the class of
plaintiffs that may recover for NIED.'
Eileen Dunphy was watching her
fiance, with whom she had lived for two years, change a flat tire when he was

200. 642 A.2d 372 (N.J. 1994).
201. James Podgers, Witnesses to Tragedy: Courts Open Door To More Suits For Negligent
Infliction Of Emotional Distress, 81 A.B.A. J., Jan. 1995, at 44.
202. Id.
203. Id. Podgers argues that the claim must satisfy the policy of not hauling a defendant into
court without adequate cause. Id. A requirement of death or serious injury in the presence of a
close family member of the victim, or with the family member arriving at the scene in the aftermath,
constitutes an adequate burden on the defendant. Id.
204. Id.
205. Dunphy v. Gregor, 642 A.2d 372 (N.J. 1994).
206. 642 A.2d 372 (N.J. 1994).
207. Id. at 377.
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She accompanied him
run over by another car and dragged nearly 250 feet.'
to the hospital, where he died the next day.'
Prior to Dunphy, the rule in
New Jersey for NIED cases was that only members of the victim's immediate
family who witnessed the infliction of injuries could recover for NIED.21 °
Rejecting a "bright-line" distinction between a married and unmarried person,
the New Jersey Supreme Court instead adopted a fact-driven approach to
recovery for NIED based on the relationship of the parties."1 ' The New
Jersey Supreme Court held that the solution to the question of expansion of
bystander liability lay in the application of the principles of tort law.212
Application of tort law principles serves to determine whether a particular
claimant is owed a duty of care, rather than using a hastily-drawn "bright-line"
distinction between married and unmarried persons.213 The Dunphy court
acknowledged that the critical determination of an interpersonal relationship
necessary to adjudicate a NIED claim arising from that relationship must be
guided by a focus on those factors that identify and define the intimacy and
familial nature of such a relationship. 21 4 The court devised a standard that
takes into account: 1) the duration of the relationship; 2) the degree of mutual
dependence; 3) the extent of common contributions to a life together; and 4) the
extent and quality of shared experience. 21' As non-familial relationships are
considered as candidates for recovery, advocates and critics of such a course of
action have raised several policy arguments concerning the issue.
B. Arguments Against Expansion of the Bystander Recovery Rule
The expansion of the Bystander Recovery Rule in Dunphy has been both
supported and criticized. 211 Several policy reasons have been used to justify

208. Id. at 373.
209. Dunphy v. Gregor, 642 A.2d 372, 373 (N.J. 1994).

210. Portee v. Jaffee, 417 A.2d 521, 526 (N.J. 1980).
211. Dunphyv. Gregor, 642 A.2d 372, 376 (N.J. 1994).
212. Id. (quoting People Express Airlines, Inc. v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 495 A.2d 107, 107

(N.J. 1985)).
213. Id.
214. Id. at 378.
215. Dunphyv. Gregor, 642 A.2d 372,378 (N.J. 1994). The last two factors include "whether
the plaintiff and the injured person were members of the same household, their emotional reliance
on each other, the particulars of their day to day relationship, and the manner in which they related
to each other in attending to life's mundane requirements." Id.
216. Dunphyv. Gregor, 617 A.2d 1248, 1248 (N.J. 1992). The New Jersey Appellate Court
ruled that a jury should be allowed to determine whether the relationship of cohabitants engaged to
be married was the functional equivalent of an intimate familial relationship. Id. at 1254. However,
a dissent in the appellate court interpreted the "familial relationship" as one restricted to marriage
or blood ties. Id. at 1255. See also Portee v. Jaffee, 417 A.2d 521, 526 (N.J. 1980) (recognizing
the existence of a marital or intimate familial relationship as being essential to a cause of action for
NIED); Elden v. Sheldon, 758 P.2d 582, 588 (Cal. 1988) (refusing to extend the cause of action for
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the rejection of a claim by a non-family member for NIED.2" 7 In Nieto v.
City of Los Angeles,"' the argument was made that providing unmarried
cohabitants with the same rights as married persons would inhibit the states'
interest in promoting the marriage relationship. 29 The Nieto court reasoned
that the state accords marriage special treatment in recognition of its solemn and
binding nature.'
The court reasoned that providing unmarried cohabitants
the same treatment could impede the state's interest in promoting marriage."
The emphasis on the state's interest in promoting marriage is based on the
fact that "formally married couples are granted significant rights and bear
important responsibilities toward one another which are not shared by those who
cohabit without marriage.'
The state's interest in marriage is demonstrated
by those state statutes that govern the requirements for entry into and
termination of marriage, the property rights which flow from that

NIED to persons in a cohabitant relationship).
217. John L. Diamond, Dillon v. Legg Revisited: Toward a Unified Theory of Compensating
Bystanders and Relatives for IntangibleInjuries, 35 HASTINGS L.J. 477, 492 (1984) (stating that
recovery for damages for NIED involving the consequences of a negligent act must be limited in
order to avoid an intolerable burden on society); Borer v. American Airlines, Inc. 563 P.2d 858,
861 (Cal. 1977) (holding that foreseeable injury to a legally recognized relationship does not
necessarily give rise to a cause of action, and that "social policy must at some point intervene to
delimit liability"); Laws v. Griep, 332 N.W.2d 339, 340 (Iowa 1983) (holding that the policy
favoring marriage is "rooted in the necessity of providing an institutional basis for defining the
fundamental relational rights and responsibilities of persons in organized society"); Mobaldi v.
Regents of Univ. of California, 55 Cal. App. 3d 573, 582 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976) (expressingthe view
that to require a court to inquire into the relationship of the partners to determine whether the
"emotional attachments of the family relationship" existed between the parties would impose a
difficult burden on the courts).
218. 138 Cal. App. 3d 464 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982).
219. Id. at 470.
220. Id. (quoting Mott v. Mot, 22 P. 1140 (Cal. 1889)).
221. Nieto v. City of Los Angeles, 138 Cal. App. 3d 464, 470-71 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982).
Unmarried cohabitants with enforceable contracts for support clearly differ as a class
from spouses and putative spouses. Spouses receive special consideration from the state,
for marriage is a civil contract 'of so solemn and binding a nature ... that the consent
of the parties alone will not constitute marriage ... ; but one to which the consent of
the state is also required.
Mott v. Mott, 22 P. 1140 (Cal. 1889). Marriage is accorded this degree of dignity in recognition
that "[t]he joining of man and woman in marriage is at once the most socially productive and
individually fulfilling relationship that one can enjoy in the course of a lifetime." Marvin v. Marvin,
557 P.2d 106, 122 (Cal. 1976). Consonant therewith, the state is most solicitous of the rights of
spouses. See, e.g., Civ. Code §§ 5100 et seq. The state affords similar protection to certain
putative relationships in recognition of the good faith in which the innocent party undertook to
marry. Civ. Code, § 4452. Unmarried cohabitants receive no similar solicitous statutory protection,
nor should they; such would impede the state's substantial interest in promoting and protecting
marriage. Id. at 469.
222. Elden v. Sheldon, 758 P.2d 582, 587 (Cal. 1988).
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relationship, =3 and the laws imposing various obligations on spouses, such as
the duty of support.' Opponents of expansion of the Bystander Recovery
Rule believe that expansion would grant some of the legal benefits of marriage
without the associated obligations, thus impeding the state's interest.'
Another argument against expansion of the bystander recovery rule is the
burden that such an expansion would impose on the courts.'
The expansion
of the "Dillon rule" to include nonfamily members would require a court to
inquire into the relationship of the partners to determine whether the "emotional
attachments of the family relationship" existed between the parties 7 and
whether the relationship was "stable and significant."'2 The problem with an
analysis of an unmarried cohabitation relationship is that it would require a
massive intrusion into the private lives of the partners, with a corresponding
increase in the expense of proving which relationships meet the standard.'
Finally, opponents of the expansion of the bystander recovery rule argue
that the number of persons to whom a negligent defendant owes a duty of care
must be limited.'
As a New York judge commented in Tobin v.
Grossman," "[e]very injury has ramifying consequences, like the ripplings
of the waters, without end. The problem for the law is to limit the legal
consequences of the wrongs to a controllable degree."2 2 This argument
against expansion of the rule reasons that, if recovery for mental distress is
permitted, it must be limited so as not to unreasonably burden all human activity
by compelling the defendant to pay for the hurt feelings of every other disturbed

223. Cal. Civ Code, § 4000 et. seq.
224. See Elden, 758 P.2d at 587 (citing Cal. Civ. Code § 4000 §§ 242, 244).
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. See Mobaldi v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 55 Cal. App. 3d 573, 582 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976)
(allowing a foster mother to recover damages for emotional distress after she watched hospital
personnel negligently administer a fatal dose of glucose solution to her foster child, who was laying
in the plaintiff's arms as he went into convulsions and became comatose, suffering irreversible brain
damage). The close relationship test of Dillon is expressed as "one test of foreseeability that
negligent infliction of injury upon one person will cause emotional distress and consequent physical
harm to another." Id. Consequently, the emotional attachments of the family relationship and not
legal status are those which are relevant to foreseeability. Id.
228. Butcher v. Superior Court, 139 Cal. App. 3d 58, 70 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983) (suggesting
that the stability of a cohabitation relationship could be established by evidence of its duration,
whether the parties had a contract, the degree of economic cooperation, the exclusivity of sexual
relationships, and whether the couple had children).
229. Elden v. Sheldon, 758 P.2d 582, 587 (Cal. 1988).
230. Borer v. American Airlines, 563 P.2d 858, 860 (Cal. 1977); Dunphyv. Gregor, 642 A.2d
372, 382 (N.J. 1994).
231. 249 N.E.2d 419 (N.Y. 1969).
232. Id. at 424.
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person shocked at an accident. 3 Opponents also conclude that conditioning
defendants' liability upon plaintiff's ability to prove that he or she shared a
"strong bond" with the deceased or injured person would unreasonably extend
the limits of a defendant's duty.'
Thus, policy arguments have been made
that expansion will usurp the institution of marriage, unduly burden the courts,
and needlessly extend the limits of a defendant's duty.
C. Arguments For Expansion of the Bystander Recovery Rule
Proponents of expanding the bystander recovery rule maintain that attention
must be given to the close emotional ties between unrelated or distantly related
persons, for at times it is undeniable that such relationships may offer as much
affection, support, and solace as is provided by immediate family members. 5
Proponents argue that the emotional trauma suffered as the result of injuries to
a person in such a relationship is as devastating as that suffered by a member
of the immediate family.?
Those in favor of extending the bystander
recovery rule also assert that limiting the class of bystanders to those individuals
with marital or intimate familial relations will sufficiently circumscribe the
defendant's liability. 7 In light of the modem advances made in medical and
psychiatric science, some courts view expansion of bystander recovery as a trend
which adapts the law to the dynamics and nuances of modem twentieth century
society. 2
Advancements in modem science make psychic injury more easily proved
despite the absence of a physical manifestation or the presence of a blood

233. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 55, 353-54 (3d ed. 1964).
234. See Elden v. Sheldon, 758 P.2d 582, 585 (Cal. 1988); see also Tobin v. Grossman, 249
N.E.2d 419, 421 (N.Y. 1969). Moreover, the difficulty of proving a strong bond would give rise
to fictitious claims. Eldon, 758 P.2d at 588. A determination whether a partner in an unmarried
cohabitation relationship may recover damages for emotional distress based on such matters as the
sexual fidelity of the parties, and their emotional and economic ties would require a court to
undertake a massive intrusion into the private life of the partners. Id. at 587. Further, application
of these factors would not provide a sufficiently definite and predictable test to allow for a consistent
application from case to case. Id.
235. Elden, 758 P.2d at 588.
236. Id.
237. James v. Lieb, 375 N.W.2d 109 (Neb. 1985). In James, a young boy saw his sister run
over by a truck and killed. Id. at 111. Though the Nebraska courts had not extended recovery to
siblings outside of the zone of danger, they had expanded on the "zone of danger rule," deciding
that in an action for NIED, the relationship between the plaintiff and the victim is the most crucial
element in determining foreseeability. Id. The court held that a plaintiff bystander has a cause of
action for negligently inflicted foreseeable emotional distress upon a showing of a marital or intimate
familial relationship with a victim who was seriously injured or killed as a result of the proven
negligence of a defendant. Id. at 115.
238. Paugh v. Hanks, 451 N.E.2d 759, 762 (Ohio 1983).
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9
Therefore, expansion of bystander iecovery
relationship with the victim.
insures an individual's right to emotional tranquility, through a genuine claim
4
However, the determination of both
against a blameworthy defendant.'
seriousness and reasonable foreseeability must be accomplished on a case-bycase basis, since no fixed or immutable rule is capable of resolving all the cases
l
Finally, some proponents of the
brought under an action for the NIED.
expansion of the bystander recovery rule maintain that the mental distress of a
bystander is directly related to the strength of the bond between that bystander
Therefore, recovery should logically be based on the
and the victim. 2
strength of the bond. This syllogism is violated by blindly restricting recovery
many strong
ignoring
thereby
members,
family"
"immediate
to
243
relationships.

Only the relationship between the victim and bystander relates in any
2
significant way to foreseeability. " Thus, the foreseeability of a distinct class
of plaintiffs, identified by applying a standard that recognizes the strength of the
bond between bystander and victim and whether or not there is an intimate
familial relationship, should dictate recovery for NIED. In this way, the other
elements of the bystander cause of action, such as contemporaneous observation,
death or serious injury to the victim, and severe emotional injury to the plaintiff,
will structure the kind of "particularized foreseeability" that ensures that the
class of plaintiffs is reduced even further and that limitless liability is
One can reasonably foresee that people who enjoy an intimate
avoided.'
familial relationship with one another are especially vulnerable to emotional
injury resulting from a tragedy befalling one of them. Thus, foreseeability
based on that standard preserves the distinction between ordinary emotional
injuries that would be experienced by friends and relatives in general and those
"indelibly stunning" emotional injuries suffered by one whose relationship with
the victim "at the time of injury, is deep, lasting, and genuinely intimate."2
Once the degree of intimacy in the bystander-victim relationship is recognized,

239. Id. at 765.
240. Id. In Paugh, the plaintiff feared for the safety of her children and was emotionally
injured when a car crashed through her house. Id. at 761. The court held it was not necessary that

the victim (whose safety was feared for by the plaintiff-bystander) even suffer actual physical harm.
Id. at 764. Further, a strict blood relationship between the accident victim and the plaintiff
bystander, though present in this case, is not necessarily required. Id. at 766. The more closely
the plaintiff and the victim are related, the more likely it is that the emotional injury was reasonably

foreseeable. Id. at 767.
241. Paugh v. Hanks, 451 N.E.2d 759, 766 (Ohio 1983).

242. Id.
243. Hallahan, supra note 27, at 445.
244. Diamond, supra note 217, at 487-89.
245. Dunphy v. Gregor, 642 A.2d 372, 377 (N.J. 1994).

246. Id.
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the special circumstances surrounding the injury to the victim can be used to
qualify the plaintiff for recovery. 7 To extend the duty of care owed a victim
to a bystander as a foreseeable and protectable person does not increase the
burden of care or extend it beyond what is ordinarily expected and
appropriate.'
However, as the proposed model will advocate, the burden of
proof, by way of circumstances of the case at hand, can be increased as the
bystander-victim relationship becomes more distant. 9
Contract, property, and labor rights have been stretched to their limits as
the judicial system has searched for alternative solutions to the "immediate
family" requirement for bystander recovery.'
However, as the court noted
in Dunphy, irrespective of the label placed upon a particular relationship, it is
a question for the jury as to whether the interpersonal bonds upon which the
cause of action is based actually exist."
The court in Dunphy developed a
standard that focused on factors that identify and define the intimacy and familial
nature of such a relationship." 2 The standard takes into account: 1) the
duration of the relationship; 2) the degree of mutual dependence; 3) the extent
and quality of shared experience; and 4) whether the plaintiff and the injured
person were members of the same household, their emotional reliance on each
other, the particulars of their day-to-day relationship, and the manner in which
they related to each other in attending to life's mundane requirements. 3 The
major decisions concerning NIED since Dillon v. Legg show a need to resolve
the inconsistent holdings of the last twenty-five years surrounding bystander

247. Special circumstances include whether there was death or serious injury, whether the
plaintiff was in the zone of danger, or manifested physical injuries from the emotional distress, and
whether the plaintiff contemporaneously observed the accident. See infra section V, notes 254-96
and accompanying text.
248. Dunphy v. Gregor, 642 A.2d 372, 377 (N.J. 1994). See also Hopkinsv. Fox & Lazo, 625
A.2d 1110, 1120 (N.J. 1993) (emphasizing that duty owed to a potential purchaser who was injured
when she fell at an "open house" "arises . . . when . . . such an inspection is part of the
professional services that would be undertaken by a reasonable broker"). To extend a similar duty
of care to an engaged cohabitant does not increase the burden of care beyond what is ordinarily
expected and appropriate for reasonable drivers. Dunphy, 642 A.2d at 377.
249. See infra section V for an illustration of how the burden of proof shifts to the plaintiff,
as the relationship to the victim becomes more attenuated.
250. See infra notes 260-64 and accompanying text.
251. Dunphy v. Gregor, 642 A.2d 372, 378 (N.J. 1994) (holding that "[a] defendant should
always have the right, even in the case of a parent and child or a husband and wife, to test the
operative facts upon which the claim is based irrespective of the relationship involved"). Id. See
infra section V, notes 254-96 and accompanying text for a graphical representation of operative facts
vs. the relationship involved in order to determine recovery.
252. Dunphy, 642 A.2d at 378.
253. Id.

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol30/iss3/4

Bassi: It's All Relative: A Graphical Reasoning Model for Liberalizing R

1996] EMOTIONAL DISTRESS-MODEL FOR RECOVERY 949
recovery. Section V will provide a model by which the courts can arrive at
consistent results on which a bystander-plaintiff may recover in an action for
NIED.
V. MODEL REASONING TO DETERMINE BYSTANDER RECOVERY
A. Description of the Model
Presently no legislation exists that addresses the major issues' that have
been considered by the courts to determine bystander recovery in an action for
NIED. Each court has adopted its own strategy to address the problem, resulting in inconsistent decisions that do not apply the same rules on a case-by-case
basis."
This approach has failed to create uniform standards among the
states, with a consequential loss of judicial efficiency as each court addresses
issues common to many jurisdictions in a different way, resulting in
contradictory opinions.
This Note has surveyed policy considerations surrounding bystander claims
to achieve a cohesive policy regarding recovery for certain types of intangible
loss, instead of the patchwork of rulings decided since Dillon.'
Zoning law,
family law and employment law have been analyzed for determinative elements
with which a court can ascertain who can recover without substantially
increasing the liability of negligent actors. As a summary of the diverse rulings,
a chart is provided which shows the overall lack of uniformity among various
jurisdictions and the resulting need for change. Although the chart indicates a
willingness by the courts to grant recovery to plaintiffs other than spouses or
blood relatives, plaintiffs with very similar bystander-victim relationships and

254. Major issues include: 1) the relationship of the bystander to the victim; 2) whether the
victim was seriously injured, or died; 3) whether the bystander contemporaneously viewed the
accident or came on the scene shortly thereafter; 4) whether the bystander was in the zone of danger,
and 5) whether the bystander exhibited physical manifestation of the emotional distress injury. For
a full discussion of these issues, and how the courts could apply them to determine recovery for
NIED, see infra section V.B, notes 275-85 and accompanying text.
255. See supra sections II-IV, notes 39-253 and accompanying text.
256. The major cases analyzed in this note are summarized in the chart on pages 950-5 1. The
chart has a column for each of: 1) the jurisdiction that decided the case; 2) the case name; 3)
whether the plaintiff was a direct victim or a bystander; 4) whether the plaintiff was in the zone of
danger; 5) whether the victim suffered serious injury, or death; 6) whether the plaintiff had physical
manifestation of the emotional injury; 7) whether the plaintiff had sensory and contemporaneous
observance of the accident rather than coming on the scene afterwards; 8) the relationship of the
plaintiff to the victim; 9) whether the plaintiff was granted recovery as parasitic damages; 10)
whether the plaintiff was granted recovery; and 11) the total "objective factor" grade. For a
discussion of parasitic damages see supra note 13. For a discussion of the "objective factors" and
the grading system, see infra note 258 and accompanying text.
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similar circumstances of injury, share markedly dissimilar results."
The
chart on pages 950-51 summarizes the most influential decisions from the early
cases recognizing emotional distress as an item of damage, to the most recent
bystander decisions since Dillon v. Legg."

257. The plaintiff in Thing v. La Chua, 771 P.2d 814 (Cal. 1989), did not recover, while the
plaintiffs in Dziokonski v. Babineau, 380 N.E.2d 1295 (Mass. 1978) and Gates v. Richardson, 719
P.2d 193 (Wyo. 1986), did. All plaintiffs were parents of the victim, and did not contemporaneously observe the accident. Further, the plaintiff in Elden v. Sheldon, 758 P.2d 582 (Cal. 1988)
and the plaintiff in Dunphy v. Gregor, 642 A.2d 372 (N.J. 1994), were both part of a cohabitating
couple in a very similar set of circumstances, and yet Dunphy recovered while Elden did not. See
chart, infra note 258 and accompanying text.
258. 441 P.2d 912 (Cal. 1968). The chart contains decisions concerning bystander recovery
for NIED, and represents eightjurisdictions, in chronological order for each jurisdiction. Five direct
victim cases are represented for comparison, however, the bystander cases are what concerns the
proposed model. The eleventh column in the chart is a point total derived from the following
schedule:
1)
Severe Emotional Distress (Assumed) = 0
2)
Death = 2;
or
3)
Serious Injury = 1
4)
Contemporaneous Observance = 2;
or
5)
Arrival in the Aftermath = 1
6)
Physical Manifestation = 2
7)
Plaintiff in the Zone of Danger = 2
The graded criteria are hereinafter referred to as "objective factors," and although there are eight
types, only five of them can occur simultaneously. The grading system is provided as an illustration
of how the courts should evaluate the circumstances of the accident relevant to the relationship of
the plaintiff, to the victim. The chart shows that historically plaintiffs with a low grade of 0 - 2, like
the plaintiff in Garrard, Rodrigues, and Gates, have recovered, while a plaintiff with many factors
in his or her favor has been denied recovery, like the plaintiff in Elden.
The Dillon court set guidelines that assumed that as the relationship between the victim and
the person witnessing the accident becomes more attenuated, the mental harm to that person becomes
less plausible. Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912, 917-18 (Cal. 1968). However, as the chart shows,
negligent conduct towards property, a corpse, or a co-worker has resulted in recovery, while death
to a child has not. The model will allow recovery to a plaintiff more distantly related, if other
distress-inducing "objective factors" are present. Thus, the more subjective criteria of determining
the closeness of a bystander-victim relationship is guided by the objective factors of the case. To
illustrate how the proposed mechanism of recovery will function, a graph is provided on page
The horizontal axis of the graph represents the degree of closeness of the bystander-victim
relationship. Zero on the horizontal axis represents a bystander and victim that are complete
strangers, and a value of 12 represents a parent, child, or spousal relationship. All other
relationships are in between these two extremes. The courts will use such factors as those outlined
in Dunphy v. Gregor, the zoning laws for family dwellings, employment laws, or family law to
determine where the relationship falls relative to the two extremes. See infra notes 272-74 and
accompanying text for a discussion of the criteria used to define a familial relationship.
Once the degree of intimacy is determined, the "objective factors" of the case are used to
arrive at the point represented on the vertical axis. A plot of the "objective element" grade vs. the
degree of closeness of the bystander-victim relationship shows the spacial relationship between the
cases presented in the chart. A baseline is established using a stranger with all the objective factors
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The requirement that the bystander be closely related to the victim embodies
the judgment that only the most profound emotional interests should receive
vindication when negligently injuredY 9 This conclusion requires an analysis
of those relationships outside of the immediate family which have merited
recovery by the courts in the past. These relationships include cohabitating
couplesm concern for property by the property owner," t foster parentfoster child relations, 2 concern arising out of a contractual relationship,'
and concern for a step-relation. 4 As the relationship between bystander and
victim is less clearly defined by blood, it becomes subject to other elements of

present compared to a parent with emotional distress only, as in Garrard, for the negligent treatment
of a corpse. Any claim to the left of the baseline should be denied recovery, while any claim to the
right should obtain recovery. A case that falls directly on the baseline will be granted recovery only
at the discretion of the court. Thus, as the relationship between bystander and victim diminishes,
the "objective factors" become more determinative of recovery. The slope of the graph was
determined by drawing a "best fit" to the cases which represent the outer limits of recovery in a
bystander action for NIED, Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Gottshall, 114 S. Ct. 2396 (1994), Dunphy
v. Gregor, 642 A.2d 372 (N.J. 1994), and St. Elizabeth Hosp. v. Garrard, 730 S.W.2d 649 (rex.
1987). For a complete discussion of these cases, see infra note 270, supra notes 165-71 and 206-16
and accompanying text. The plaintiffs in Gottshall, Dunphy, and Garrard all recovered and
represented a very distant relationship of a co-worker in Gottshall, to a very close relationship of
a parent and child in Garrard. The Dunphy fianc6 relationship represented a point that was midway
between these extremes. Using these cases as reference points, other representative cases were
plotted, and all but Thing v. La Chusa were consistent with the courts' actual decision. In Thing,
recovery was not granted, however, under the proposed model recovery should have been granted.
Elden v. Sheldon was not granted recovery by the courts, and since it falls on the baseline, Elden
would not recover solely on the basis of this model.
259. Dunphy v. Gregor, 642 A.2d 372, 377-78 (N.J. 1994).
260. Id. See supra notes 206-16 and accompanying text for a complete discussion of the
Dunphy case.
261. Brown v. Crocker, 139 So. 2d 779 (La. Ct. App. 1962). Allowing recovery for the
mental anguish one suffers upon witnessing the loss of one's property, yet not allowing this type of
recovery for witnessing an injury to a close relation is inconsistent. See also Rodrigues v. State,
472 P.2d 509 (Haw. 1970).
262. Mobaldi v. Regents of The Univ. Of Cal., 55 Cal. App. 3d 573 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976).
In Mobaldi, the mother of a foster child that sustained permanent brain damage through due
negligence of the hospital sought damages based on her intimate "family-like" relationship with the
child. Id. at 573.
263. Holland v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 135 So. 2d 145 (La. Ct. App. 1961). In Holland,
parents brought suit for mental anguish damages for worrying about their child eating rat poison.
The parents were granted recovery arising out of the exterminator's contract with the parents. Id.
at 145, 157.
264. Leong v. Takasaki, 520 P.2d 758 (Haw. 1974). In Leong, the court ruled that a stepgrandson was entitled to recover damages for NEED for witnessing the death of his step-grandmother
caused by the defendant's negligent conduct. The court found the relationship to be of the same
quality as a blood relationship, given the local prevailing custom in Hawaii of grandparents being
responsible for child care. Id. at 766. In Leong, the step-father gave his mother responsibility for
caring for his step-son. Id.
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definition, such as duty.'
The body of case law assembled in this Note has
served to analyze each instance of bystander action for NIED in order to find
those elements common to the plaintiffs that recover. The proposed model will
balance the concerns of excessive litigation against the rights of those parties
involved in an intimate familial relationship worthy of recovery.
The proposed model assumes that the court will decide the degree of
intimacy of the bystander-victim relationship through the use of existing law
dealing with family issues. Various communities across the country in states
such as California, Colorado, and Minnesota, have devised local statutes to deal
with non-traditional families in the gay population.'
Some labor unions and
employers have allowed bereavement leave for the death of foster children, steprelations, and in some cases, anyone that has lived in the bereaved person's
home for more than one year. 7 Provisions such as these have been used by
courts in the past to determine the degree of intimacy of the bystander-victim
relationship.'
The Federal Employer's Liability Act (FELA) has allowed employees who
were bystanders to the death or serious injury of a co-worker to recover for
NIED.2
However, while FELA expanded the group of potential plaintiffs

265. The duty may be that of a parent to provide for a child's safety or of any bystander who
may be a care provider for the victim. See Eyrich v. Dam, 473 A.2d 539, 547 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1984) (viewing a person who has been entrusted with the care of a child, and has
witnessed the child's accidental death as experiencing an excruciating burden of guilt). Further, the
court argued that one's status as a child's temporary caretaker should fulfill the condition of being
bound by an intimate family tie. Id. The court declined to extend bystander recovery to the plaintiff
as custodian, stating that an extension of the law should come from the Supreme Court. Id.
266. The following municipalities have adopted some type of domestic partnership ordinance:
Berkeley, Los Angeles, Santa Cruz, and West Hollywood, California; Takoa Park, Maryland; New
York City, New York (allowing bereavement leave only); and Madison, Wisconsin. Berkeley, Santa
Cruz, and West Hollywood extend health care benefits to domestic partners. See Koch Grants Paid
Leave To Unmarried Couples, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 8, 1989, at B3. West Hollywood, Cal., Mun.
Code §§ 4220-28 (1985), reprinted in Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc., Domestic
Partnership: Issues and Legislation, Oct. 1990, at 101-04 (unpaginated collection of reprints; page
numbers count from first text page) (allowing domestic partners, both residents and nonresidents,
to register their relationships at city hall, and providing for visitation rights at local hospitals and
jails). A subsequent law provides eviction protection against the domestic partners of tenants in rentcontrolled apartments. See Stephen Braun, PresentedTo W. Hollywood Council: Voluminous Rent
Law a Creatureof Compromise, L.A. TIMES, June 16, 1985, § 9, at 1. In 1989, the city extended
insurance benefits to the domestic partners of city employees. See Ron Russell, W. Hollywood Will
Insure Partners of Single Employees, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 22, 1989, Metro Section, at 3. See also
Scott Harris, Council O.K's Leave for Unwed Partners, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 6, 1988, § 2, at 1.
267. CITY OF SOUTH BEND, INDIANA, EMPLOYEE BENEFIT HANDBOOK (1994).
268. See infra notes 272-73 for a listing of factors used by courts to determine the intimacy of
a given relationship.
269. Federal Employer's Liability Act (FELA), 35 Stat. 65, as amended, 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60
(1988).
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who may recover outside of the immediate family, it has narrowed the
mechanism by which they may recover by requiring the plaintiff to be in the
"zone of danger. "
The following model provides a remedy for bystander-plaintiffs who are
now excluded from recovery for NIED because their relationship with the victim
is not linked by blood, marriage, or adoption. The model distinguishes several
classes of plaintiffs, ranging from those with a traditional familial relationship
to the victim, to those with a relationship based on domicile, contract, or
employment with the victim. The list of plaintiffs is not meant to be exhaustive,
as it is up to the court to determine the degree of intimacy of the bystandervictim relationship in the case at hand and grant recovery if certain factors are
present. Thus, the model will address a bystander-victim relationship based on
non-traditional elements that give rise to a deep, lasting emotional connection,
each in its own way unique. However, by granting weight to the "objective
factors" present in a given case, a court will achieve the proper balance between
the relationship and the circumstantial elements of the case at hand.27'
Expanding bystander liability to non-traditional bystander-victim
relationships will create an eminently foreseeable, but discrete class of plaintiffs.
The purpose of this model is not to determine the degree of intimacy in a
bystander-victim relationship for a claim for NIED, but to provide a sufficiently
definite and predictable method that will allow for consistent decisions on
recovery from case to case, once the court has established where the relationship
lies. The traditional categories of blood, marriage, and adoption are under-and
over-inclusive with respect to the qualities that the state seeks to promote by
providing protection to people sharing these relationships.2"
Therefore, it is the totality of the relationship, as evidenced by the

270. Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Gottshall, 114 S. Ct. 2396, 2399-2400 (1994) (holding that
since the zone of danger test presently is followed by 14 jurisdictions, it remains a well-established
.common law" concept of negligence that is suitable for determination of the federal question of
what constitutes negligence for purposes of FELA).
271. See supra note 258 and accompanying text for an identification and definition of the
"objective elements."
272. James D. Esseks, Redefining The Family-Braschi v. Stahl Associates, 74 N.Y.2d 201,
543 N.E.2d 49, 544 N.Y.S.2d 784 (1989), 25 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 183 (1990). These
qualities include emotional and financial interdependence, long-term cohabitation, and exclusive
devotion. Id. at 200 n.52. The traditional family relationships are underinclusive because
nontraditional families often exhibit them as well. Id. The traditional categories "are overinclusive
because many marital, adoptive and blood relationships do not maintain these characteristics." Id.
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dedication, caring and self-sacrifice of the parties, which should control.2"
This model does not establish new criteria to define the closeness of a bystandervictim relationship. Instead, the solution proposes more barriers for recovery
as the bystander-victim relationship becomes more distant. However, in order
to apply the solution, the court must decide the degree of intimacy between the
bystander and victim, evaluating any of a variety of factors used by courts in the
past.274 Once the status of the relationship has been established, the model can
be applied to determine the barriers to recovery that the plaintiff must overcome.
A graphical representation of the application of the model is provided on page
965.
B. Application of the Model to Example Cases
1. Definitions
1) Direct Victim: Plaintiff who is put in fear for his or her own safety
based on actions of the defendant and sustains direct physical injury.
2) Bystander: Plaintiff who, not directly sustaining physical injury,
witnesses peril or injury to another.
3) Impact Rule: Limits recovery for NIED to cases where the injured
party sustained a contemporaneous physical impact or injury.
4) Family Relationship: Relationship between bystander and victim arising
out of blood, marriage, or other special, legally recognized circumstances,
such as adoption or foster care.

273. Braschi v. Stahl Associates, 543 N.E.2d 49, 55 (N.Y. 1989) (holding that a ten-year
relationship between two gay partners fulfilled any definitional criteria of the term family). In
Braschi, two men that were gay life partners lived as a couple for over 10 years. Id. The two men
shared a strong emotional bond, maintained a faithful and exclusive commitment to one another and
linked their financial lives through joint bank accounts. Id. The court evaluated their relationship
based on the exclusivity and longevity of the relationship, the level of emotional and financial
commitment to each other, and the reliance placed upon one another for daily family services. Id.
274. The court may confine its "inquiry to an examination of contracts, powers of attorney,
wills, life insurance policies and other written documents, as a basis for establishing a family
relationship." Esseks, supra note 272, at 200 n.61. There are also many elements of unmarried
cohabitation, some of which may not be present in any particular relationship. They include: joint
housing, joint economy, joint ownership of real and personal property, children together, meals
together, sexual relations, looking upon themselves and being looked upon by friends and family as
a unit, and looking upon themselves and being looked upon by friends and family as having
responsibility for each other in case of accident or illness. Note, Looking For A Family
Resemblance: The Limits Of The Functional Approach To The Legal Definition Of Family, 104
HARV. L. REV. 1640 (1991). See supra notes 200-05 and accompanying text.
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Commentary: This solution is provided for recovery of bystanders only, but has
defined a direct victim as well as a bystander in order to differentiate between
the two. The family relationship is defined in order to distinguish plaintiffs with
a traditional familial relationship from the extended classes of plaintiffs which
this model seeks to reach. Finally, the impact rule is defined as a point of
comparison to the more liberal zone of danger and physical manifestation
requirements to better grade the mechanism of recovery to plaintiffs as they
become more distantly connected to the victim.
2. Objective Factors
(1) Severe Emotional Distress: An invasion of an individual's right to peace of
mind that "includes fright, nervousness, grief, anxiety, worry, mortification,
shock, humiliation and indignity, as well as physical pain. " '
Severe
emotional distress is beyond that which would be anticipated in a disinterested
witness.27 In terms of this model, severe emotional distress is assumed in
order to bring an action for NIED, and does not add weight to the claim.
Weight factor = 0.
(2) Death: Death of the victim. Weight factor = 2; or
(3) Serious Injury: Serious injury to the victim. Weight factor

=

1.

(4) Contemporaneous Observance: Presence at the scene of the accident at the
time it occurs, with sensory perception and awareness that the event is causing
injury to the victim. Weight factor = 2; or
(5) Arrival in the Aftermath: Arrival on the scene of the accident shortly after
its occurrence, but without material change in the condition and location of the
victim. Weight factor = 1.
(6) PhysicalManifestation: The psychic injury must manifest itself in physical
injury that is at least objective in some regard so that causation can be attributed
to the defendant's negligence and can be proved through qualified medical
witnesses. 2' Weight factor = 2.
(7) Plaintiff in the Zone of Danger: Plaintiff is in the zone of danger to his
physical well-being at the time that he sustained the fright, shock, or emotional
distress giving rise to the claim. Weight factor = 2.

275. Deevy v. Tassi, 130 P.2d 389, 396 (Cal. 1942).
276. Thing v. La Chusa, 771 P.2d 814, 815 (Cal. 1989).
277. 1 MINZER ET AL., supra note 14, at § 5.24(4).
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Commentary: No single "objective factor" defined in this solution is dispositive
of a plaintiff's right to recovery for NIED. The factors are meant to be taken
cumulatively, and then balanced against the degree of closeness of the bystanderA plaintiff can have up to five of these factors
victim relationship.
simultaneously," or only severe emotional distress,' which is given no
weight, yet still recover in both situations, depending on the degree of closeness
of the bystander-victim relationship. However, even though no one "objective
factor" is absolutely necessary for recovery, sensory and contemporaneous
observance of the accident is directly linked to the bystander being in the zone
of danger, and therefore the zone of danger requirement will rarely, if at all, be
a necessary factor for recovery without being accompanied by contemporaneous
observance. Fear for the safety of another has merited recovery in the past;'5
thus, the severe injury or death factor is not necessarily linked to the others.
However, fear for safety of another has not been given any weight in this
model. Many more factors will have to be present as the plaintiff s relationship
with the victim becomes more attenuated.
3. Examples
a. TraditionalBystander
All bystanders that are related by blood, marriage, or adoption to the victim
of the defendant's negligence may recover for NIED if any objective factor,
in addition to severe emotional distress, is present. If only emotional
distress is present, the court may consider other factors to determine
recovery.28'

Minimum Objective Factor Grade = 0.
2 2
The plaintiff in Garrardwas
Example: St. Elizabeth Hospital v. Garrard.
a parent, however recovery was granted only for the mishandling of a corpse.
There was no contemporaneous viewing, injury, or death, or other physical

278. Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Gottshall, 114 S. Ct. 2396, 2406 (1994). See chart, supra note
258 and accompanying text.
279. St. Elizabeth Hosp. v. Garrard, 730 S.W.2d 649, 654 C'rex. 1987). See chart, supra note
258 and accompanying text.
280. Paugh v. Hanks, 451 N.E.2d 759, 766 (Ohio 1983) (holding that a cause of action for the
negligent infliction of "emotional distress may be stated where the plaintiff-bystander reasonably
appreciated the peril which took place, whether or not the victim suffered actual physical harm, and,
that as a result of this cognizance or fear of peril, the plaintiff suffered serious emotional distress").
281. Other factors might include a lack of recovery from other sources or parasitic damages.
See supra note 13.
282. 730 S.W.2d 649 (Tex. 1987). See supra notes 165-71 and accompanying text for a
complete discussion of the holdings in Garrard.
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manifestations.
b. NontraditionalBystander
1) Co-Employee Relationship.
Any bystander that has worked for over one year with the victim of
the defendant's negligence may recover for NIED if all objective
factors are present and:
A) The defendant's negligence results in death, rather than serious
physical injury to the victim.
B) The bystander had sensory and contemporaneous observance of the
accident, rather than coming on the scene in the aftermath.
Minimum Objective Factor Grade = 8.
Example: In the case of ConsolidatedRail Corporation v. Gottshall, 3 the.
plaintiff contemporaneously viewed his friend and co-worker collapse from heat
exhaustion and die of a heart attack. The plaintiff was working under the same
conditions, and was therefore in the zone of danger. Further, the plaintiff
suffered physical manifestations of his emotional distress. Thus, under the
model, the plaintiff had objective factors with a total weight of eight, and was
certainly more than a complete stranger to the victim. Therefore, as shown on
the graph, recovery should be granted.
2) Shared domicile/de facto spousal relationship.
Any bystander that has shared the same household for more than two years
with the victim of the defendant's negligence may recover for NIED if:
A)

The bystander was in the zone of danger of the accident.

Objective factor = 2.

B) The emotional distress suffered by the bystander results in physical
manifestations. Objective factor = 2.
and either:
C) The defendant' negligence results in serious injury to the victim
rather than death. Objective factor = 1. Along with:
The bystander had sensory and contemporaneous observance of the

283. 114 S. Ct. 2396 (1994).
the holdings in Gottshall.

See supra note 270 and accompanying text for a discussion of
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accident. Objective factor = 2.
Or:
D) The defendant's negligence results in death to the victim rather
than serious injury. Objective Factor = 2. Along with: The plaintiff
came on the scene in the aftermath of the accident rather than
contemporaneously observing it. Objective Factor = 1.
Or:
E) The defendant's negligence results in death to the victim rather
than serious injury. Objective Factor = 2. Along with:
D) The bystander had sensory and contemporaneous observance of
the accident. Objective factor = 2.
Minimum Objective Factor Grade = 7, although 8 is one of the
alternatives.
Example: In Elden v. Sheldon,' the plaintiff was in the zone of danger, the
victim died, and the plaintiff viewed the accident contemporaneously. The
circumstances of the case gave the plaintiff an objective factor grade of six,
precluding him from recovery under the model, since his de facto spousal
relationship was not deemed close enough to a traditional spousal relationship
to grant recovery. However, this case is very close to recovery by the model.
The court could take into account that Elden suffered physical impact, and thus
grant him recovery as a direct victim rather than a bystander, although this
would take the plaintiff outside the scope of this model.
3) Contractual Relationship, Caretaker, or Custodian.
Any bystander who has had a contractual relationship for more than one
year to provide primary care to the victim of the defendant's negligence is
subject to the same criteria for recovery as that of a relationship of shared
domicile only. This may also include situations in which a plaintiff has
been entrusted with the temporary care of a loved one. Such bystanders
may recover if their total objective factor grade is a minimum of six. 5
Two examples of a grade of six or more which will warrant recovery are:
A) The defendant's negligence results in death to the victim rather
than serious injury. Objective Factor = 2.

284. 758 P.2d 582 (Cal. 1988). See supra notes 1-6 and accompanying text for a discussion
of the holdings in Elden.
285. In cases of objective factor grades of one through six, any of a multitude of combinations
of objective factors will reach the same numerical minimum or more. Therefore, one example is
provided for illustration purposes. However, the court must go to the facts of the case to calculate

the specific objective factor grade for a specific case.
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B) The plaintiff came on the scene in the aftermath of the accident
rather than contemporaneously observing it. Objective Factor = 1.
C) The bystander was in the zone of danger of the accident.
Objective Factor = 2.
D) The emotional distress suffered by the bystander results in
physical manifestations. Objective Factor = 2.
Objective Factor Grade = 7.
or
A) The defendant's negligence results in death to the victim rather
than serious injury. Objective Factor = 2.
B) The bystander had sensory and contemporaneous observance of the
accident. Objective Factor = 2.
And at least one of the following:
C) The bystander was in the zone of danger of the accident.
Objective Factor = 2.
D) The emotional distress suffered by the bystander results in
physical manifestations. Objective Factor = 2.
Objective Factor Grade = 6.
I

Example: In Eyrich v. Dam,'8 a couple was entrusted with the son of a
neighbor for an evening at the circus. 7 The child was subsequently mauled
by a leopard and died from his injuries.'
The woman in charge of his care
witnessed the entire event, and the man in charge attempted to rescue the child,
and was himself injured. 9 The man also suffered physical manifestations of
his emotional distress.' ° Under the model, the female plaintiff would not
recover, as she would have a weight factor of four, since she contemporaneously
viewed the accident which resulted in death to the victim. The man could be
considered a direct victim, in which case the model would not apply. However,
at the discretion of the court, the man could be considered a bystander who was
in the zone of danger, in which case he would have a weight factor of eight and
would recover under the model. In order for the female plaintiff to recover, her
relationship to the victim must be determined by the court to be at least as close

286.
287.
288.
289.
290.

473 A.2d 539 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1984).
Id.at 541.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 543.
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as the fianc6 relationship in Dunphy.
4) Fianc6.
Any bystander who has had a monogamous relationship with the victim for
more than one year with evidence of plans to marry." Such bystanders
may recover if their total objective factor grade is a minimum of four.3
An example of a grade four which will warrant recovery is:
A) The defendant's negligence results in death to the victim rather
than serious injury. Objective factor = 2.
And at Least One of the Following:
B) The bystander had sensory and contemporaneous observance of the
accident. Objective Factor = 2.
C) The bystander was in the zone of danger of the accident.
Objective Factor = 2.
D) The emotional distress suffered by the bystander results in
physical manifestations. Objective Factor = 2.
Minimum Objective Factor Grade = 4.
Example: The case of Dunphy v. Gregor falls into this area. The fianc6
relationship falls between that of a stranger and a true spousal relationship.
Since Dunphy contemporaneously viewed the accident, and the victim died, she
would have an objective factor weight of four and would be on the outer limits
of recovery according to the model.
5) Cohabitant who has had children with victim.
Any bystander who has had a monogamous relationship with the victim for
more than one year and has had children with the victim of the defendant's
negligence may recover if their total objective factor grade is a minimum
of five.'
An example of a grade five which will warrant recovery is:
A) The defendant's negligence results in death to the victim rather
than serious injury. Objective Factor = 2.

291.
elements
292.
293.

See supra notes 206-15 and accompanying text for a discussion of the determinative
of a fiance relationship used by the court in Dunphy.
See supra note 285.
Id.
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B) The plaintiff came on the scene in the aftermath of the accident
rather than contemporaneously observing it. Objective Factor = 1.
C) The emotional distress suffered by the bystander results in physical
manifestations. Objective Factor = 2.
Objective Factor Grade = 5.
Example:
The case of Ledger v. Tippitt falls into this category. In
Ledger, the plaintiff lived with the victim continuously for three years, and bore
his child. 95 The plaintiff saw the decedent stabbed while seated in a vehicle
a few feet away from him.'
Under the model, the plaintiff had
contemporaneous viewing of the event, and the victim died, for a weight factor
of four. Under the model, the Ledger case is directly on the baseline, and there
would be no recovery. However, unlike the Elden case, the court noted three
facts present to distinguish Ledger from a mere cohabitation relationship: 1) the
plaintiff made two attempts to marry the decedent; 2) the plaintiff bore the
decedent's child; and 3) the plaintiff was economically dependant on the
decedent. All of these factors make the relationship more familial or intimate
than that of a cohabitant, therefore the court may grant recovery.
VI. CONCLUSION

Until this point in time, expansion of the bystander rule in a tort action for
NIED has required that the court balance the concerns of excessive litigation
against the rights of close family members. However, the definition of what
constitutes a "family" has been rapidly changing in the last several years. With
the rise of single parent households, foster parents, and relationships within the
gay community, the question of who qualifies as an individual who may recover
under a tort action for NIED has been left up to the judge to decide.
The recent case of Dunphy v. Gregor has identified several criteria for
determining the family status of a given plaintiff. However, the criteria used to
identify such a relationship is too unstable and unpredictable to manage the
metamorphosis that has taken place in the traditional definition of family. An
evaluation of the bystander-victim relationship, without a corresponding analysis
of the circumstances surrounding the act of negligent conduct, is insufficient to
provide a fair and balanced solution to bystander recovery. Therefore, the time
has come to relate more objective criteria present in a given case to the
relationship involved, in order to derive a more consistent method for deciding
who should recover. This Note proposes a model that provides weights to

294. 164 Cal. App. 3d 625 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985).

295. Id. at 630-31.
296. Id. at 631.
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various elements present in bystander actions for NIED, and moves away from
a bright-line standard for determining who will recover. The proposed model
employs "objective elements" that have been considered by courts in the past
and applies them in a consistent manner for a case-by-case analysis. The
proposed model will result in a dependable method for remedying the injured
party while maintaining judicial efficiency.
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